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Abstract
It is well established that investor sentiment plays a vital role in global finan-
cial markets. However, the sentiment of other economic agents has received less
attention in the behavioural finance literature. This thesis aims to address the
impact of managerial sentiment on the UK stock market. It investigates the per-
formance of managerial sentiment in predicting stock returns relative to investor
and consumer sentiments. In addition, it examines how sentiment is transmit-
ted from managers to investors and whether the response of investor sentiment is
asymmetric towards positive versus negative managerial sentiment. Finally, this
thesis provides a comparative study of traditional and sentiment-augmented asset
pricing models.
Using monthly data from January 1985 to December 2014 and a sample of
consumer and business confidence indicators provided by the European Commis-
sion, the first chapter provides novel evidence on how managerial and consumer
sentiment indicators affect stock returns. The findings show no support for con-
sumer confidence as a predictor of stock returns. However, managerial sentiment
shows a significant impact on aggregate market and sector return indices. Fur-
thermore, results indicate that parameter estimates for sector groupings are not
consistent, implying that the sentiment-return relationship differs across sectors
and that parameters are sensitive to industry characteristics.
In the second chapter, the investigation extends to assess the long and short-
run dynamics of the sentiment transmission from managers to investors. Using
threshold autoregressive (TAR), momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR),
and asymmetric threshold vector error correction (ATVECM) models, the findings
provide evidence on the impact of managerial sentiment on investor sentiment in
support of the Catering Theory. Results show that investors’ sentiments converge
with long-run equilibrium relationships in response to positive rather than nega-
tive shocks in managerial sentiment. Furthermore, findings indicate that investor
sentiment reacts negatively to positive managerial sentiment with a delay of four
i
months, suggesting an over-confidence in managers’ expectations of their future
business outcomes.
Finally, the third chapter examines the ability of managerial and investor sen-
timent to explain cross-sectional variation in stock returns. It compares the perfor-
mance of CAPM, Fama & French (1993) Three factor model and Carhart (1997)
four factor model to sentiment-augmented asset pricing models, which incorporate
measures of both managerial and investor sentiment. The findings indicate that
inclusion of sentiment factors significantly adds to the power of traditional asset
pricing models to explain the cross-sectional variation in stock returns. In addi-
tion, results show that managerial sentiment outperforms investor sentiment in ex-
plaining three out of four test portfolios formed on size, book-to-market, volatility
and size/momentum factors. Moreover, findings show that managerial sentiment
exhibits stronger prediction power for size premium over short (1-3 months) fore-
casting horizon relative to investor sentiment. However, value premiums respond
to changes in managerial and investor sentiment over the relatively longer time of
12 months. In addition, the investigation failed to find any significant relationship
between sentiment indices and momentum premium.
This study has several implications for empirical researchers, practitioners
and policy makers. It provides academics who are concerned with the empirical
tests of asset pricing models with new insights on how the inclusion of managerial
sentiment impacts the performance of longer term investigated models. For prac-
titioners, our findings suggest that managerial sentiment and its impact on sector
returns provide new opportunities for enhancing trading as well as asset allocation
strategies. In developing investment strategies, practitioners may consider sectors
that are more or less prone to sentiment in response to investor risk preferences. In
addition, results on sentiment-augmented asset pricing models may be of interest
to regulators who are concerned with the estimation of businesses’ cost of capital
when pricing public services.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Surely, an economy cannot be rational, which for its very being depends upon
practices that are a disgrace to human nature.”
– James Beattie, Dissertations Moral and Critical, (1783, p. 587)
1.1. Research background and motivation
In his early work on the behavioural foundations of economic theory, Kenneth
Arrow (1986) argues that individual rationality is often an essential assumption
for an economic theory to exist. The importance of the rationality assumption
stems from its usefulness in providing solutions to frequent theoretical economic
and financial problems in which economic agents are assumed to maximise their
expected utility. For example, classical finance theory assumes investors are ratio-
nal and diversify to optimize the statistical properties of their investments. In an
economy with such rational investors, markets are efficient as asset prices fully re-
flect all available information and follow martingales (Lucas, 1978). Even if some
investors are irrational and drive prices away from their intrinsic values, prices
are brought back into equilibrium by the actions of arbitrageurs (Antoniou et al.,
2013; Baker & Wurgler, 2006).
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However, a considerable body of evidence has developed involving prolonged
price anomalies in stock markets such as the closed-end fund puzzle, excess volatil-
ity, and calendar effects. Such anomalies cannot be understood under the tradi-
tional Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) of Fama (1970). In addition, studies
show that arbitrage is limited and incurs costs that prevent rational investors from
restoring market equilibrium (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Consequently, the influ-
ence of irrational investors or ‘noise traders’ on stock prices persist, so relaxing the
rationality assumption becomes crucial to understand the dynamics of the stock
market.
Moreover, psychological studies pioneered by Herbert Simon (1955, 1979)
show that decision makers’ rationality is bounded and individuals’ reasoning pro-
cesses frequently involve systematic errors. Furthermore, relaxing the rationality
assumption led to developing theories that attempt to understand how investors
make choices under risk and uncertainty. One example is the Prospect Theory
developed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979). In Prospect Theory, investors eval-
uate their assets based on gains and losses instead of their final wealth. They
are also loss averse in the sense that their avoidance of losses is greater than their
attraction to gains. Moreover, individuals often rely on their intuition and feelings
instead of on more deliberative, tedious reasoning (Glatzeder et al., 2010). Under
such perspective, the dynamics of the economy and financial markets cannot be
isolated from the nature of individual behaviour.
Therefore, the role of investor sentiment in causing mispricing of securities
becomes more important than previously anticipated (Cook et al., 2003). How-
ever, researchers continue to debate investor sentiment measures and their impact
on stock returns. For instance, closed-end fund discounts, which are considered
to be a measure of (small) investor sentiment, remain a puzzle. Other sentiment
measures like investor surveys, trading volume, mutual fund flow, retail investor
trading, dividend premiums and insider trading have all been proposed as indica-
tors of investor optimism and pessimism. Furthermore, several studies have used
consumer confidence as a proxy for investor sentiment (Jansen & Nahuis, 2003;
Lemmon & Portniaguina, 2006; Otoo, 1999).
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However, the literature on behavioural finance has focussed less attention on
the role of managerial sentiment in the stock market. Managers have superior
information about their companies that gives them an advantage over investors.
For example, Meulbroek (1992) shows that insider trading led to higher abnormal
returns due to information asymmetry. We expect that if managers hold sentiment
towards their businesses, it must be informed and have the capability to forecast
future stock prices. Furthermore, and as evidenced by the literature, managers
continuously aim to influence stock prices by using corporate activities to cater for
investor sentiment (Baker & Wurgler, 2013). Revealing their sentiment towards
the future of their businesses may represent one such activity. It follows then that
investigating managerial sentiment would provide more insights into how managers
interacts with investors in the stock market.
1.2. Study aims and contribution to knowledge
The objective of this thesis is to understand the impact of managerial senti-
ment on stock returns. To achieve our objective, we aim to answer three streams
of questions; the first stream concerns the impact of managerial sentiment on stock
returns at aggregate market and sector levels. In particular, the study attempts
to answer the following questions: Does managerial sentiment significantly predict
aggregate market returns? If so, is the aggregate sentiment-return relationship
driven by specific sectors in the market? Does the impact of sentiment on stock
returns differ across sectors? If so, what characteristics affect the nature of the
relationship in each sector? What is the impact of major events on relationship
between sentiment and returns? Does the impact differ in specific sectors more
than others? How does managerial sentiment compare to consumer and investor
sentiments in predicting stock market returns?
In the second stream, the main questions we attempt to answer are whether
the sentiment of managers is transmitted to investor sentiment? If so, does in-
vestor sentiment asymmetrically respond to positive versus negative managerial
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sentiment? Finally, in the light of previous answers, the study aims to understand
the impact of the inclusion of managerial and investor sentiment on the perfor-
mance of traditional asset pricing models and what influence do managerial and
investor sentiment indicators have on size, value and momentum anomalies.
The study contributes to the literature by answering these questions. It argues
that managerial sentiment should be used as a powerful predictor of stock returns.
It also sheds some light on the importance of studying sentiment at a disaggregated
level since market participants do not hold the same sentiment towards each sector
of the market. In addition, this thesis contributes knowledge on how managers
interact with investors in the stock market and reveals some managerial practices
that affect stock prices and how they drive investor sentiment to achieve their
goals.
In chapter 2, the thesis investigates the relationship between managerial sen-
timent and sector returns. Using UK monthly data from January 1985 to Decem-
ber 2014 and a sample of consumer and business confidence indicators provided by
the European Commission, we provide novel evidence on how managerial and con-
sumer sentiment indicators affect stock returns. We find no support for consumer
confidence as a predictor of stock returns. However, managerial sentiment shows a
significant impact on aggregate market and sector return indices. Furthermore, we
find that parameter estimates for sector groupings are not consistent, implying that
the sentiment-return relationship differs across sectors. We also find parameters
are sensitive to industry characteristics. Importantly, the overall sentiment-return
relationship is dominated by sentiment associated with manufacturing firms.
In chapter 3, we investigate the relationship between managerial and investor
sentiments in the UK market. As a starting point, we construct a core managerial
sentiment index (CMSI) based on the findings of Salhin et al. (2016). Relative
to individual measures of investor sentiment, our tests indicate that CMSI is a
powerful predictor of stock returns and its performance is less sensitive to changes
in stock market return indices. Moreover, we provide evidence for the impact
4
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of managerial sentiment on investor sentiment in support of the Catering The-
ory. In addition, we use Threshold Autoregressive (TAR), Momentum Thresh-
old Autoregressive (MTAR), and Asymmetric Threshold Vector Error Correction
(ATVECM) models to estimate the asymmetric long and short-run dynamics of
sentiment transmission from managers to investors. Our findings show that in-
vestor sentiment converges to a long-run equilibrium relationship in response to
positive rather than negative shocks in managerial sentiment. Furthermore, results
indicate that investor sentiment reacts negatively to positive managerial sentiment
with a delay of four months. These results suggest that managers are generally
over-confident with regards to the future outcomes of their businesses.
The final chapter examines the ability of managerial and investor sentiment to
explain UK stock returns. We compare the performance of CAPM, Fama & French
(1993) Three Factor Model, and Carhart (1997) Four Factor Model to sentiment-
augmented asset pricing models, which incorporate measures of both managerial
and investor sentiment. Our findings indicate that the inclusion of sentiment fac-
tors significantly adds to the power of traditional asset pricing models in explaining
the cross-sectional variation in stock returns. In addition, results show that man-
agerial sentiment outperforms investor sentiment in explaining three out of four
test portfolios formed on size, book-to-market, volatility and size/momentum fac-
tors. Furthermore, we evaluate the relative pricing errors of the models using
the non-parametric distance of Hansen & Jagannathan (1997). Our results offer
evidence that managerial sentiment models yield small distance errors relative to
traditional asset pricing models. Moreover, we investigate whether managerial and
investor sentiment can predict size, value, and momentum premiums over different
forecasting horizons. We show that managerial and investor sentiment indicators
exhibit stronger forecasting power for size premiums over a shorter forecasting
horizon. On the contrary, value premiums are affected by managerial and investor
sentiment over a longer horizon of 12 months. However, we find no evidence for
the impact of sentiment indices on momentum premium.
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1.3. The UK stock market
The focus of this study is on the UK market. The main reason for select-
ing the UK market is due to the availability of data on managerial sentiment for
the aggregate market and for sectors. Data for our sample is provided by the
European Commission (EC) which spans the period from January 1985 to De-
cember 2014. The data provides essential information for business activities and
short-term forecasting and is often used to predict turning points in the economic
cycle.
In addition, the London Stock Exchange is considered one of the major stock
exchanges in the world and is the largest in Europe. It has roots that stretchs back
to the coffee houses of the 17th century and it operates in London which ranks at
the top of the Global Financial Centres Index (see Figure 1.1). The exchange has
approximately 3000 companies from over 70 countries that are listed and traded on
its markets. Therefore, investigating the UK market would provide more insights
for understanding the impact of managerial sentiment in Europe and the global
market.
Figure 1.1: Global Financial Centres Index
The figure is adapted from Accessing the Global Market Through London
report, available at: http://www.lseg.com
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Furthermore, another reason for investigating the UK market is to antici-
pate future research opportunities. The European Commission (EC) provides the
data on managerial and consumer sentiments for 27 European Countries. For ev-
ery country, businesses and consumers are surveyed for their opinions regarding
economic and business conditions. The surveys are then harmonized to generate
comparable data for the countries that have been surveyed. The availability of
such data will allow for an expansion of this research to other European countries.
1.4. Outline of the thesis
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 investigates the rela-
tionship between managerial sentiment and stock returns at the aggregate market
and sectors levels. Chapter 3 examines sentiment transmission from managers
to investors. The empirical tests of traditional versus sentiment-augmented asset
pricing models are detailed in chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis.
7
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Managerial Sentiment, Consumer
Confidence and Sector Returns
2.1. Introduction
Studies in the relatively recent field of behavioural finance have identified
pricing anomalies which contradict the expectations of the efficient markets hy-
pothesis. In particular, considerable attention has focused on how market prices
are influenced by investor sentiment (Baker & Wurgler, 2006; Baker et al., 2012;
Da et al., 2015; Lee et al., 1991). Investor or market sentiment is defined in the
financial literature as the prevailing attitude or feeling in the market as revealed
by movements of stock prices. A large and growing literature examines the rela-
tionship between various proxies for investor sentiment and stock returns. We add
to this literature in two ways. Using UK data from European Commission (EC)
business and consumer surveys between January 1985 and December 2014, we
analyse managerial sentiment as a proxy for investor sentiment. Further, we ex-
amine the impact of managerial sentiment and consumer confidence, a commonly
used proxy for investor sentiment, on stock returns at the sectoral level.
Investment-related sentiment is not directly observable and so previous stud-
ies have used a number of proxies - including investor surveys, closed-end fund
8
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discounts, mutual fund flows and composite sentiment indices - which have been
found to significantly influence stock prices (Baker & Wurgler, 2006; Frazzini &
Lamont, 2008; Lee et al., 1991). In addition, various studies use information pro-
vided by consumer sentiment surveys as measure of investor sentiment (Ferrer
et al., 2016; Fisher & Statman, 2003; Jansen & Nahuis, 2003; Otoo, 1999). How-
ever, their findings do not provide a consistent view of the association between
consumer confidence and market values.
Contrary to consumer confidence studies, surveys of business confidence assess
managerial sentiment regarding past and future performance. When compared to
consumers, managerial access to business information allows for a more informed
opinion of future market conditions. In this view, managerial sentiment informs
investor sentiment and thereby stock-pricing. Baker & Wurgler (2013) include
both sentiment from corporate insiders and surveys of consumer confidence in their
list of potential proxies for investor sentiment. Thus, the first contribution of our
study is to provide evidence on how managerial sentiment differs from consumer
confidence in predicting stock returns.
Furthermore, sentiment studies predominantly examine the impact of investor
sentiment proxies on aggregate market sentiment. Brown & Cliff (2004) suggest
that aggregate sentiment measures are used primarily due to data limitations
since sentiment measures such as surveys, advance-decline ratio and closed-end
fund discounts are not commonly available at disaggregated levels. In addition,
Brown and Cliff argue that aggregate sentiment effects become negligible when the
number of stocks affected by high sentiment equals the number of stocks affected
by low sentiment. This argument suggests that, when sentiment varies between
sectors, aggregate measures of sentiment may not be sufficient to detect impacts
on stock prices. Thus, our study also provides new evidence on the impact of
investor sentiment on sector returns. Moreover, increasing attention to industry
effects in the investment allocation literature provides further support for exam-
ination of sentiment at industry level. For example, Chen et al. (2006) suggest
that industry-based investment strategies are more effective than country based
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strategies. Marcelo et al. (2013) find that diversification based on industry leads
to more efficient portfolios.
By examining the associations between managerial sentiment and sector re-
turns, we provide significant evidence for investors and portfolio managers regard-
ing which industries are most susceptible to sentiment. In addition, our findings are
informative for policy-makers and regulators whose decisions affect stock prices.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: The next section reviews the
existing literature. Section 3 describes the data and provides some descriptive
statistics and preliminary tests. Section 4 describes the methodology used and
discusses results. Section 5 concludes.
2.2. Literature review
There has been a long running debate in the academic literature regarding the
success of the efficient market hypothesis in explaining the predictability in asset
returns. The classical theory assumes financial markets are efficient; investors are
rational and diversify to optimize the statistical properties of their investments.
Even if some investors are irrational, prices are brought back into equilibrium
by the actions of arbitrageurs (Antoniou et al., 2013; Baker & Wurgler, 2006).
It follows then that there is no role for investor irrationality on asset pricing.
However, research on behavioural finance confirms that investor sentiment affects
stock prices and mispricing is persistent due to costly and non-profitable arbitrage
(Lee et al., 1991).
2.2.1 Market-based measures of sentiment
Although the relation between investor sentiment and stock returns is well
documented in numerous studies (Baker & Wurgler, 2006, 2007; Brown & Cliff,
2004; Da et al., 2015; Schmeling, 2009), researchers continue to debate sentiment
measures and their impact on stock returns. Indeed, there is a large literature
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that documents the measurability of investor sentiment and its impact on stock
prices. Despite using different proxies to measure sentiment, the overall conclusion
is that sentiment is highly correlated with stock returns. For example, Baker &
Wurgler (2006) use a group of sentiment proxies and principal component analysis
to investigate the relationship between sentiment and stock returns. Their results
suggest a significant correlation between sentiment and lead returns, in particular
younger and smaller stocks. Such stocks are more likely to attract the attention of
optimists and speculators who buy on the hype of stocks and sell after the hype is
over. Similarly, using technical indicators, survey data from investor intelligence,
and trading activity-related variables, Brown & Cliff (2004) find evidence support-
ing the co-movement of sentiment measures with market returns, particular in the
long-run.
Another strand of research focuses on the predictability of sentiment to stock
returns using individual sentiment proxies. For example, Fisher & Statman (2000)
used Wall Street strategists’ mean allocation to stocks as a proxy for sentiment of
large investors and report a negative relationship with S&P 500 returns. In another
key study, Lee et al. (1991) used closed-end fund discount as a proxy for investor
sentiment, and argued that closed-end fund discounts and small stocks owned by
individuals co-move with investor sentiment. In the same vein, Kaniel et al. (2008)
use the imbalances in the orders of individual stocks on the NYSE as a sentiment
measure and find evidence supporting strong predicative power of future returns.
Further, using net flows of mutual funds as a proxy of investor sentiment, Ben-
Rephael et al. (2012) found a contemporaneous relationship between net exchanges
to equity funds and changes in stock market prices. Similarly, issuing higher levels
of equity shares compared to debt is believed to capture the market enthusiasm and
predicts subsequent lower returns (Baker & Wurgler, 2000). Lee et al. (1991) use
the number of IPOs and average first day returns of IPOs as proxies for investor
sentiment. They find that companies tend to time the market and issue IPOs
during periods of positive sentiment. Consistent with Lee et al. (1991), Cornelli
et al. (2006) indicate that investor sentiment can explain the underperformance of
the IPOs returns.
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2.2.2 Survey-based measures of sentiment
Due to the lack of directly-observable indicators measuring investor senti-
ment, a number of previous empirical studies employ consumer confidence indices
to proxy for investor sentiment (Schmeling, 2009). Consumer confidence indicators
(CCIs) are perceived to contain information that predicts future market conditions
such as household spending, total personal consumption growth and expenditures
on consumer durables (Bram & Ludvigson, 1998; Carroll et al., 1994; Throop,
1992). Furthermore, stock market studies report a contemporaneous correlation
between CCIs and stock market returns. However, results vary on the direction
of causality between them. For example, Fisher & Statman (2003) investigate the
validity of consumer confidence as a proxy of the individual investor sentiment and
its predictive power of stock returns. Overall, they find a positive contemporane-
ous relationship between changes in consumer confidence and S&P 500 returns.
In another study, Otoo (1999) use US data and find that consumer confidence
is affected by the increase in equity value. Elsewhere, using EU data, Jansen &
Nahuis (2003) find evidence supporting the relationship between CCIs and stock
returns, in particular in the short run. Additionally, they reported that stock
returns predict consumer confidence but not vice versa. In contrast, Schmeling
(2009) found that consumer confidence negatively predicts stock market return for
18 industrialized countries. Further, Charoenrook (2005) investigate the Univer-
sity of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index explanatory power for stock market
return and find a positive relationship between the changes in consumer sentiment
and the contemporaneous excess market returns in the long run, but negatively
related to the future excess returns at one-month and one-year horizons.
Consistent with Brown & Cliff (2004), Wang et al. (2006) and Canbas¸ &
Kandır (2009) indicate that investor sentiment proxies are caused by stock re-
turns and volatility rather than vice versa. According to Ferrer et al. (2016), the
causality from stock returns to CCIs could be interpreted as an information effect
(higher stock returns means good economic conditions and higher optimism) or
as a wealth effect (higher value of equity leads to higher wealth). On the other
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hand, Lemmon & Portniaguina (2006) identified the forecasting power of investor
sentiment, as measured by consumer confidence, in predicting stock market re-
turns and find a relationship between consumer confidence and stock returns only
for small stocks and stocks with low degrees of institutional ownership. Similarly,
Schmeling (2009) suggests that there is a two-way causality such that investor sen-
timent depends on previous returns and the returns depend on previous investor
sentiment. For trading strategies, Antoniou et al. (2013) find that CCIs affects the
profitability of momentum-based strategies but only in periods of high optimism.
They argue that in periods of high sentiment, smaller investors are reluctant to sell
losing stocks. Conversely, larger investors are usually ready to sell losing stocks
promptly and profit from momentum strategies.
Most recently, Ferrer et al. (2016) argue for the inappropriateness of consumer
confidence indicator as a proxy for investor sentiment. Using data for the EU and
the US, they investigated the relationship between stock returns and CCIs around
the dotcom bubble period. Their finding suggests that CCIs failed to forecast stock
returns, particularly for the EU countries after the dotcom bubble. Importantly,
the majority of studies finding support for CCIs as a measure of sentiment have
used US data. This may reflect the sentiment of individual investors who represent
a larger proportion of US market participants compared to the EU market.
2.2.3 Sector effect
The majority of literature on the relationship between investor sentiment and
stock returns concerns the aggregate market. Notably, studies on how equity man-
agers allocate their investment pay considerably more attention to sectoral effects
on returns and diversification strategies (Baca et al., 2000; Cavaglia et al., 2000;
Griffin & Karolyi, 1998). For example, Chen et al. (2006) investigated the im-
portance of sector effects in diversification strategies for developed and emerging
markets. Their findings suggest that, for developing markets, sector-based strate-
gies become more important than country-based strategies. For emerging markets,
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they advocate sector-based strategies despite finding that country-based strategies
still dominate the allocation of investments in these markets.
Another stream of research provides evidence on the significance of indus-
try factors on periods with high volatility (see for example, Marcelo et al., 2013;
Soriano & Climent, 2006). In a key study, Marcelo et al. (2013) find that industry-
based diversification leads to more efficient portfolios. Additionally, they provide
an evidence supporting diversification across industries provides better protec-
tion in periods of high volatility compared to diversification associated with coun-
tries. In addition to the impact of industries on investment diversification, recent
studies have investigated industry-level returns as predictors of economic activity.
Laopodis (2016) examines the relationship between industries returns, macroeco-
nomic variables and aggregate market returns. The findings show that industry
portfolios explain macroeconomic indicators such as inflation, unemployment rate
and dividend yield. Further, Laopodis demonstrates that returns in some indus-
tries such as Food, Mining, Consumer, Construction and Machinery contain valu-
able information supporting decisions related to investments on the stock market.
Overall, findings with respect to the importance of industry effect provide support
for our investigation of the relationship between sentiment and return at a sectoral
level.
As evidence against the reliability of consumer confidence indicator has ac-
cumulated and the importance of investigating the sentiment-sector return rela-
tionship have been documented, in our study, we argue that managerial sentiment
is an appropriate predictor of stock market return since managers possess direct
information of the past, current and the future of their businesses compared to
consumer. In addition, the availability of data on sector-specific sentiment pro-
vides the ability to asses how the sentiment-return relationship is shaped by the
characteristics of each industry.
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2.3. Data and descriptive statistics
2.3.1 Data on investor sentiment
This study uses confidence indicators published by the European Commis-
sion (EC) as proxies for investor sentiment. The indicators are calculated using
business and consumer surveys which are conducted on a monthly basis by na-
tional institutions (such as ministries, statistical offices, central banks, research
institutes, business associations or private companies) in 27 European countries.
For every country, businesses and consumers are surveyed seeking their opinions
regarding the economic conditions and short term forecasting. The surveys are
then harmonized to generate comparable data for the countries that have been
surveyed.
For business indicators, five surveys are conducted on a monthly basis with
more questions added to every survey on a quarterly basis. The surveys cover
Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade, Services, and Financial Services sec-
tor groupings. A biannually investment survey of the Manufacturing sector is
conducted to gather information on companies’ investment plans. Classification
of business surveys into sectors follows the classification of economic activities in
the European Community (NACE Rev. 2). The EC includes multiple industries
in each of the five sector groupings. Therefore, each survey under the NACE
Rev. 2 classification reflects one or more industries of the Industry Classification
Benchmark (ICB). For example, the EC Manufacturing sector cover Industrials
and Basic Materials industries from the ICB.1
Survey data is collected for the period from January 1985 to December 2014
for all sectors except the services sector. For the Services sector, data is not
available until January 1997. Prior to May 2006, the Services sector surveys
included Financial Services firms. From May 2006 onwards, Financial Services
sentiment was surveyed separately. This indicates a statistical break in the Services
1 More information is available in the Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business and
Consumer Surveys guide available at http://ec.europa.eu, accessed on 26 May 2016.
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sector sample. Therefore, we take the Services sector sentiment as our indicator
for the sample period from May 2006 to December 2014. For Financial Services,
confidence indicators is not available for individual countries but rather for the
whole EU. Hence, they are excluded from our analysis as a sentiment index. The
number of companies covered by EC surveys by sector is displayed in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1
Sample size for business surveys in the UK and the EU.
This table presents the sample size for business surveys in the UK and the EU. In the UK, business surveys are
collected by National Institutions (NI) such as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and Experian
(EXP).
Sectors Manufacturing Services Retail trade Construction
UK 1500 1000 500 750
EU 38,270 43,720 30,730 22,140
NI CBI CBI CBI EXP.
Monthly surveys are performed in the first ten days of each month for all
business and consumer indicators. Survey questions use a Likert-type scale with
responses divided into three, five or six options in an ordinal scale. Example of
replies are (“increase”, “remain unchanged”, “decrease”), (“more than sufficient”,
“sufficient”, “not sufficient”), or (“too large”, “adequate”, “too small”). Sample
questions for each sector and the method of constructing confidence indicators are
included in Appendices 1 and 2.2
The aggregate sentiment indicator for the market, Economic Sentiment In-
dicator (ESI), is the weighted average of all confidence indicators with 40% to
Manufacturing, 30% to Services, 20% Consumers, 5% for each of Construction
and Retail Trade sectors.3 The descriptive statistics for ESI and sector confidence
indicators are shown in Table 2.2.
Values for ESI are transformed to have a mean of 100 and standard deviation
of 10. The whole market is identified as optimistic about the economy if the value
of the ESI is above 100 and pessimistic if it is below 100. Each of the business
and consumer confidence indicators has a mean equals zero. Values of confidence
indicators along with Economic Sentiment Indicator are presented in Figure 2.1.
2 More information on the method is available on the EC web site at: http://ec.europa.eu,
accessed on 26 May 2016.
3 Economic Sentiment Indicator is the term issued by the EC to describe their indicator.
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Table 2.2
Descriptive statistics and correlation for economic, consumer and managerial sentiment
indicators.
Data covers the period from January 1985 to December 2014 for the economic sentiment, consumer confidence
and sector sentiment indicators except Services sector. Services sector sample starts from May 2006 to
December 2014. The fourth column represents the ”trimmed” values at 1%.
Panel A : Descriptive statistics
Economic and Consumer Confidence Indicators
mean sd trimmed min max
Economic 101.77 10.71 101.86 64.60 127.20
Consumer -9.29 8.64 -9.23 -35.20 7.60
Managerial sentiment
Manufacturing -7.33 12.59 -7.23 -49.00 21.60
Construction -17.19 23.40 -17.17 -79.30 43.10
Retail Trade 3.38 13.78 3.58 -47.10 29.00
Services -4.96 20.8 -4.79 -57.40 30.40
Panel B: Correlations
Manufacturing Construction Retail Trade Services
Construction 0.60***
Retail Trade 0.66*** 0.55***
Services 0.81*** 0.86*** 0.75***
Consumer 0.43*** 0.63*** 0.52*** 0.84***
Levels of significance for correlation coefficients are ***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
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Figure 2.1: Sentiment indicators
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Figure 2.2: UK GDP growth rate
The red line corresponds to major events which affected the UK
economy (recessions of the late-1980s, early-1990s and the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC), respectively)
All confidence indicators reflect major events in the economy. Figure 2.2 shows
the growth rate of UK GDP and indicates the major events affecting confidence
indicators during the period. Confidence indicators are associated with the major
events that have affected the UK economy including the recession of the late-1980s,
recovery in the mid-1990s and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) can clearly be
seen from the graph in Figure 2.1. On average, Retail Trade and Services sectors
encounter high average levels of confidence indicators. Notably, the Construction
industry is associated with a lower level of sentiment. Importantly, sentiment in
the Construction industry is highly sensitive to shocks in the market. Furthermore,
the effect of these shocks on the Construction sector sentiment takes more time to
return to mean levels compared to other sectors. Confidence indicators are more
volatile for Construction, Retail Trade and Services compared to Manufacturing
and Consumer confidence indicators.
Correlations between confidence indicators are relatively high and significant
between sectors. However, plotting correlations with 12 month windows over the
sample period shows a wave-like pattern indicating unstable correlation (see Figure
2.3). Confidence indicators have strong positive correlation following major events.
When the market experiences stability, correlation reverts to mean levels.
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Figure 2.3: Rolling correlation between sentiment indicators
Each graph plots the rolling correlation between two sentiment
indicators using 12 month window.
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2.3.2 Data on stock returns
Our analysis covers the relationship between consumer and managerial sen-
timent and stock returns for the aggregate market and individual sectors. We
used FTSE All Share Index monthly returns for the aggregate level of stock re-
turns. Following Jansen & Nahuis (2003), we calculated monthly returns as the
simple average of the first ten days returns to avoid any spurious causality due to
non-synchronous observations.
Sector returns have been obtained by classifying FTSE All-Share Index con-
stituents into sectors. For each firm, we used the Industry Classification Bench-
mark (ICB) obtained from Datastream. Sector returns are matched to the ’Classi-
fication’ of economic activities in the European Community (NACE Rev. 2). For
example, using the ICB system, Associated British Foods plc is classified under
the “Food Producer” sector name. Consequently, the company has been placed
under the “Manufacture of food products” category in the NACE. This ended
up with four sector return indices that match the corresponding sector sentiment
indicators and another index for Financial Services sector.4 The number of firms
in each sector is as follows: Manufacturing (212); Construction (13); Retail Trade
(34); Services (78); and Financial Services (278).
Sector returns, as displayed in Figure 2.4, are the summation of daily returns
weighted by the market value of its constituents. Returns are winsorized at 1%
level to eliminate the effect of outliers. Both FTSE All-Share Index and sectors
prices data are obtained from Datastream for the period from January 1985 to
December 2014. Table 2.3 shows descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients
for market and sector returns.
4 The reason for the inclusion of Financial Services return index despite the unavailability of a
corresponding sentiment index is its importance in the stock market. The sector accounts for
24.07% and 20.34% of the FTSE All-Share and FTSE 100 indices constituents, respectively.
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Table 2.3
Descriptive statistics and correlation for market and sector returns.
Data covers the period from January 1985 to December 2014 for the whole UK market and sectors returns
except Services sector. Services sector sample starts from May 2006 to December 2014. To remove the impact of
any outliers, we ”trimmed” our data at 1% level.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
mean sd trimmed min max
Market 0.34% 2.76% 0.43% -20.17% 6.13%
Manufacturing 0.58% 2.77% 0.67% -20.22% 6.44%
Construction 0.56% 4.27% 0.55% -16.25% 19.32%
Retail trade 0.36% 3.29% 0.40% -14.46% 10.39%
Services 0.23% 3.19% 0.32% -14.02% 5.12%
Financials 0.65% 3.54% 0.70% -19.99% 14.06%
Panel B: Correlations
Market Manufacturing Construction Retail Services
Manufacturing 0.89***
Construction 0.54*** 0.51***
Retail Trade 0.73*** 0.62*** 0.50***
Services 0.89*** 0.80*** 0.58*** 0.77***
Financials 0.88*** 0.71*** 0.50*** 0.67*** 0.83***
Levels of significance for correlation coefficients are ***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
2.3.3 Preliminary tests
Plotting the autocorrelation function for all time series shows large autocor-
relations in confidence indicators.5 That in turn leads us to examine whether our
time series are unit-root non-stationary using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF),
Philips-Perron (PP) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests. Table
2.4 summarizes all tests for both level and differenced data. Based on the three
tests, all time series except Services sectors are stationary on their level values (i.e.
they have I(0)).
Notably, both ADF and PP tests confirms that Services series is nonstationary
and has a unit root. On the other hand, KPSS test for stationarity shows that the
series is stationary. Differencing the series removes the nonstationarity behaviour
and all tests produce the same results. Consequently, service sector has either I(1)
based on ADF and PP tests or I(0) based on KPSS test. The different behaviour of
the Services sector CI will lead us to change the model used to test its relationship
with different returns series. This will be discussed in details in the next section.
5 Appendix 3 reports the graphs for autocorrelation functions for level and differenced series.
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Table 2.4
Unit root tests.
Tests are based on 360 observations for all variables except Services sector which has 104 observations. Models
used for unit root test specified to include the intercept with lags of the variable. Lag length for Augmanted
Dicky-Fuller (ADF) tests are determined by Akaike Information Criterion with maximum of twelve lags
differences. Newey-West procedure is used to calculate bandwidths for both Philips-Perron (PP) and
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests. For spectral estimation, Bartlett’s kernel is used.
Level Differenced
ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS
Confidence Indicators
Market -4.13 −2.95 0.10 -8.37 −20.15 0.05
(p-value) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000)
Manufacturing -4.22 −3.26 0.10 -6.04 −22.75 0.04
(p-value) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
Construction -3.44 −1.96 0.17 -5.04 −20.30 0.10
(p-value) (0.009) (0.176) (0.000) (0.000)
Retail Trade -4.61 −4.24 0.24 -9.08 −21.80 0.03
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Services -1.28 −1.59 0.20 –3.78 −13.62 0.14
(p-value) (0.228) (0.114) (0.000) (0.000)
Consumer -2.78 −3.09 0.17 -13.43 −21.28 0.03
(p-value) (0.050) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Returns
Market -10.00 −18.52 0.06 -10.22 −48.14 0.00
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Manufacturing -12.63 −17.66 0.13 -9.25 −46.40 0.00
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Construction -12.73 −20.06 0.06 -9.32 −54.19 0.00
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Retail Trade -7.17 −19.65 0.02 -9.80 −51.53 0.00
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Services -3.35 −8.73 0.10 -10.52 −21.06 0.01
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financials -6.74 −19.60 0.03 -10.17 −50.91 0.00
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2.4. Methodology and findings
We use Granger-Causality test to examine the causality between managerial
sentiment and stock returns (Granger, 1988). For the causality from sentiment to
return, the test determines whether lagged values of sentiment contain information
that is not already included in past values of stock returns, and vice versa. Our
choice of the methodology is consistent with previous studies on consumer con-
fidence as a proxy for investor sentiment (Ferrer et al., 2016; Fisher & Statman,
2003; Jansen & Nahuis, 2003; Otoo, 1999; Schmeling, 2009). Some studies which
use similar methods but different measures of sentiment to examine the sentiment-
returns relationship include Brown & Cliff (2004), Chung et al. (2012), Kumar &
Lee (2006), Wang et al. (2006). We conduct Granger-Causality tests on the base
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of the following equations:6
Rt = αr +
k∑
i=1
βriRt−i +
k∑
i=1
γriSt−i + υrt (2.1)
St = αs +
k∑
i=1
βsiSt−i +
k∑
i=1
γsiRt−i + υst (2.2)
where St denotes sentiment indicator at time t; Rt is the monthly return of
sector groupings and the economy at time t; υ is a disturbance term; and k is the
maximal lag.
For Services sector sentiment, we employ equations 2.1 and 2.2 using level
values with maximal lag to k. In addition, when ADF and PP tests are correct
that the Services sentiment series is I(1), we use equation 2.3 and 2.4 and follow
the procedures suggested by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) to fix the asymptotics
of the test.
Rt = αr +
k+I∑
i=1
βriRt−i +
k+I∑
i=1
γriSt−i + υrt (2.3)
St = αs +
k+I∑
i=1
βsiSt−i +
k+I∑
i=1
γsiRt−i + υst (2.4)
where I is the maximal order of integration in the model which in our study
equals 1. The lag is only used to estimate the coefficients but not in use when
estimating Wald test to test whether βi and γi are jointly zero.
6 Since unit root and stationarity tests result in a stationary I(0) series for most of the sectors,
VAR models specification uses both sentiment and returns series at their level.
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Equations 2.1 and 2.3 indicate that sentiment is believed to Granger-cause
stock prices when lagged sentiment contain information that is not already in-
cluded in past values of stock returns. The null hypothesis for estimated models
is H0: Sentiment does not Granger-cause returns. Equations 2.2 and 2.4 are used
to test the relationship from returns to sentiment. Table 2.5 reports Granger-
causality test results in both directions. The cross-correlation functions between
indices and returns are displayed in Appendix 4.
Where the right hand side of each cross correlation plot represents the corre-
lations between returns at time t and sentiment at time t + k (i.e. returns leads
sentiment), the other side reveals the correlations between returns at time t and
lags of sentiment. The pattern of the plots illustrates that sentiment is positively
correlated to lags of returns. Furthermore, this correlation disappears with the
long lags. In contrast, returns are negatively correlated to lags of sentiment sug-
gesting that high returns are associated with low sentiment in previous periods
and vice versa, which is consistent with Brown & Cliff (2005), Baker & Wurgler
(2006), Lemmon & Portniaguina (2006), Schmeling (2009). However, the relation-
ship between sentiment and returns in each pair is not necessary due to a causal
relationship. Rather, a relationship might exist as a result of common macro fac-
tors that drive both sentiment and returns (Jansen & Nahuis, 2003). The nature of
the relationship between each pair is captured by Granger causality tests reported
in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5 shows that market sentiment (Economy) Granger-causes both ag-
gregate market and Financial sector returns. The significance of this relationship
relies mainly on the Manufacturing sector sentiment that constitutes 40% of ag-
gregate market sentiment. This finding is supported by the lack of significance of
the rest of sentiment indices in causing aggregate market returns to change. In
contrast, returns of the majority of sectors Granger-cause market sentiment. At
sector level, causality runs in both directions with the exception of Retail Trade
and Services industries for which causality only runs from returns to sentiment.
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These results can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, Manufacturing and Con-
struction sectors are more prone to sentiment than Retail Trade and Services sec-
tors. Therefore, risks associated with their sentiment are translated into returns.
However, this interpretation is inconsistent with the “hard to value” argument of
Baker & Wurgler (2007). The output of both Retail Trade and Services sectors
are hard to measure (Doms et al., 2004; Mclaughlin & Coffey, 1990). Therefore,
these sectors are more likely to be prone to fluctuations in sentiment than the
Manufacturing and Construction sectors. Another way to interpret this result is
that managerial sentiment indices are constructed by surveying firms rather than
investors. Individual investors are subject to asymmetric information problems
when valuing the companies in which they invest. Firms have more internal in-
formation. Hence, firm survey data on managerial sentiment would be expected
to inform stock returns. Consequently, our results point to lower levels of infor-
mation asymmetry and less uncertainty in valuation of stocks in Manufacturing
and Construction sectors. Our data provides evidence of resolution of information
asymmetry in those sectors. Expectations are less accurately reflected in stock
returns in Services and Retail Trade sectors.
For Financial Services sector, results shown in Table 2.5 are consistent with
the literature (such as Nejad & Huerta, 2014) in terms of the direction of causal-
ity. Nonetheless, the relationship is greatly affected by Manufacturing sector sen-
timent. These results reveal that the relationship between sentiment and stock
market returns is not consistent across sectors. Where the aggregate sentiment of
the market causes adjustment to stock returns, it is the different characteristics of
the sector groupings that shapes the relationship.7
In Table 2.5, we also examine the association of consumer confidence with
stock returns at aggregate and sector levels. Notably, consumer confidence is not
7 Responses on sentiment survey contains information from companies based on their previous
month performance. This may impact the relationship from returns to sentiment if returns are
calculated using only the first 10 days. Therefore we repeated the analysis using the first 21
days and full month returns. The modifications had no impact on the results except for the
Construction sector for which the relationship becomes insignificant when using full month
returns.
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found to Granger-cause stock returns in any of our tests while stock returns only
Granger-cause consumer confidence in Manufacturing and Financials.
To further understand the nature of the return-sentiment relationship, we next
turn our attention to the components of the sentiment surveys. We breakdown our
causality tests by individual questions included in each sector survey. As shown
in Table 2.6, questions explained how company respondents in each sector feel
about past, present and future activities. Levels of confidence regarding prices
and employment expectations are also considered.
Given the fact that stock returns reflect fundamentals of companies in each
sector, we assume that stock returns explain company responses about their past
activities. Respondents are aware of the performance of their firms in the past,
which is reflected in stock returns. However, Construction sector projects have a
longer time horizon than other sector groupings. For example, long time horizons
to completion make judgment on performance more uncertain for companies and
investors. The sentiment question in the survey focuses on judging the performance
over a relatively short three-month horizon which may in part explain the inability
of past returns to predict Construction sector sentiment.
Results shown in Table 2.6 indicate that stock returns have a significant im-
pact on the expectations in the sector. Changes in stock returns cause adjustment
to the expectation about the level of the employment in all sectors. However,
returns have no effect on the expectations regarding selling prices in both Con-
struction and Retail Trade sectors. Since stock returns mainly reflect company
fundamentals, the development of expectations might be affected by availability
bias. This implies that individuals assign greater weights to recent experience.
Therefore, company expectations for the future of their activities explain how
their stocks perform in the recent past.
In contrast, we find that sentiment Granger-causes returns for most of the
sector groupings. Sentiment about production (order) expectations plays a signif-
icant role in causing the returns of the Manufacturing (Retail Trade) sectors. For
the Construction sector, expectations about the employment level are associated
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with highly significant changes in stock returns. However, for Services sector, ex-
pectations about the future appear to have no role in causing changes in stock
returns. One explanation might be the uncertainty regarding future activities in
the Services sector. Interestingly, company assessments of business activity de-
velopment over the past three months, which reflects structural changes in the
Service sector, shows a strongly significant impact on subsequent returns.
2.4.1 Robustness tests
2.4.1.1 Causality using FTSE100 Index, sectors return index and Managerial
Sentiment Indicator (MSI)
The first set of robustness tests we conducted was to change the definition
and construction of aggregate market returns and the aggregate sentiment index.
Although, the five sector return indices constituents included 87.27% of the market
capitalization of companies included in the FTSE All-Share, as a robustness check
we substituted alternative indices of aggregate market returns.8
In addition to changing the definition of aggregate market returns, we recon-
structed the Economical Sentiment Indicator (ESI) using only four sectoral sen-
timent indicators after the exclusion of consumer confidence indicator (CCI). As
discussed earlier, CCI represents 20% of the ESI, therefore elimination will result
in a pure Managerial Sentiment Indicator (MSI). The weights of the four sectors
in the MSI are adjusted pro rata to their original values in the ESI. Consequently,
the MSI is used as an aggregate sentiment index.9
We then repeated the analysis using FTSE 100 Index and an equally weighted
return index (RI 5-sectors) that contains the five previously constructed sector
return indices. In order to match the same sectors included in the ESI and the
8 The other 12.63% represents the Utilities and Health Care sectors which we excluded when
constructing sectors return indices. Although the NACE Rev. 2 classification includes utility
and health care activities, sentiment surveys do not. Hence, we exclude Utilities and Health
Care from sector return indices.
9 The calculation of indicators’ weights to construct the MSI are described in details in
Appendix 5.
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MSI, we created another index (RI 4-sectors) that encompasses all sector return
indices except Financial Services sector. As reported in Table 2.7, results show
no significant sensitivity to the change of returns definition. The results using
different indices indicate some very small differences to the FTSE All Share results.
Significance levels are largely unchanged for sentiment granger-causes returns. The
one notable difference being that Construction returns grange-cause sentiment in
the RI 5-sectors and RI 4-sectors indices.
Table 2.7
Granger causality tests using different sentiment and return indices.
This table presents the p-values for testing the sentiment-return relationship using alternative
definitions for aggregate market return index and the managerial sentiment indicator. RI 5 Sector
is an equally weighted return index of Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade, Services and
Financial Services sectors. RI 4 Sector represents the same sectors as in RI 5 Sector except the
Financial Services sector. The results cover the period from January 1985 to December 2014. r,
g-cause, and sent denote return, Granger-cause, and sentiment, respectively.
Returns Indices
FTSE-ALL FTSE 100 RI 5 Sector RI 4 Sector
Economic and Consumer Confidence Indicators
Economy (ESI) 0.0173 0.0724 0.0059 0.0059
(r g-cause sent) 0.1342 0.1324 0.0441 0.0523
Consumer 0.6673 0.9339 0.2790 0.5731
(r g-cause sent) 0.0319 0.0256 0.0200 0.0900
Managerial sentiment
Managerial Sentiment Index 0.8236 0.0650 0.0288 0.0412
(r g-cause sent) 0.0233 0.0907 0.0291 0.0458
Manufacturing 0.0003 0.0024 0.0031 0.0019
(r g-cause sent) 0.0062 0.0099 0.0136 0.0418
Construction 0.5479 0.5598 0.3700 0.2274
(r g-cause sent) 0.3240 0.3262 0.0462 0.0186
Retail Trade 0.8793 0.8588 0.8877 0.7743
(r g-cause sent) 0.0069 0.0102 0.0015 0.0021
Services 0.0992 0.1214 0.1696 0.5326
(r g-cause sent) 0.0003 0.0002 0.0045 0.0009
Services [wald test] 0.5055 0.5100 0.6900 0.7000
(r g-cause sent [wald test]) 0.0004 0.0004 0.0085 0.0110
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2.4.1.2 Causality during different periods
We further examine the predictability of managerial sentiment before and af-
ter two major stock market crises; the dotcom bubble and the GFC.10 As can be
seen by comparison of Tables 2.8 to 2.11, our main findings remain unchanged
for the dotcom bubble and the GFC periods. As before, this implies that the
sentiment associated with Manufacturing industry significantly affects both sector
and aggregate market returns. However, the reverse does not hold in either pe-
riod. This could be explained by increased attention to stock prices as a result of
the dotcom period. It is also worth noting that the EC Manufacturing question-
naire includes producers of technological products which explains the increased
significance of Manufacturing sentiment in predicting stock market returns for the
post-dot com period. Additionally, the insignificance of Construction and Con-
sumer confidence in predicting aggregate market returns is also confirmed for the
dotcom bubble.
Similarly, results before and after the GFC, as shown in Tables 2.10 and 2.11,
provide some interesting differences in results. The sentiment associated with both
the Manufacturing sector and the Construction sector become more significant in
predicting aggregate market returns after the crisis. This result could reasonably
be assumed to reflect the impact of the sub-prime crisis on the sensitivity of the
market to changes in these sectors. Sentiment in the Retail Trade sector appears
to be marginally significant in the pre-crisis period but insignificant in the post-
crisis period. Therefore, although beyond the goals of our study, the response
of asset returns to sentiment around financial crises could further be investigated
using non-linear models previously used by studies such as (Guidolin et al., 2014;
Maasoumi & Racine, 2002; McMillan, 2001)
Ferrer et al. (2016) examined CCI as a measure of investor sentiment before
and after the dotcom and the GFC meltdowns. Notably, their findings show that,
unlike the US, CCIs have an insignificant relationship with the stock market in
10Since the Services sector indicator is only available starting from April 2006, we are unable to
examine the relationship for earlier periods.
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the EU. Hence, our results are consistent with their conclusion that CCIs are an
inappropriate measure of investor sentiment, at least in the UK market, where in-
dividual investors participate less actively and less directly in stock market trading
compared to the US.11
2.5. Conclusion
In this study, we examine the association between managerial sentiment with
aggregate UK market returns and returns for five sector groupings. Using time
series of UK sector and market return indices and managerial and business confi-
dence indicators obtained from European Commission (EC), we provide evidence
that managerial sentiment is an effective predictor of aggregate and sector stock
returns. Our measure of consumer confidence is not a predictor of sector or aggre-
gate returns. However, aggregate stock returns and Manufacturing returns predict
consumer confidence in our tests.
We find evidence, both for FTSE-ALL share index and FTSE 100 index,
that the predictive power of sentiment is sector dependent. For all aggregate
sentiment measures, we find strong evidence of co-movement with the market
but little evidence of short-run predictability in returns. Additionally, our results
confirm that sentiment has a significant effect on aggregate UK stock returns
over the period and that sentiment is a significant predictor of expected returns
on average. For sector groupings, we find that stock market returns are mainly
affected by the sentiment associated with the Manufacturing and Construction
sector groupings. Further, we demonstrate that sentiment associated with the
Retail Trade and Services sector groupings have no predictive power for stock
returns.
11Individual investors in the UK own 12% of the value of equity shares traded in the stock
market compared to 37.3%in the US. For the UK, the figure is obtained from the Office of
National Statistics(ONS) available at http://www.ons.gov.uk, accessed on 20 May 2016. For
the USA, the figure is obtained from the Federal Reserve available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov, accessed on 20 May 2016.
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In order to examine how the characteristics of each sector affect the sentiment-
returns relationship, we also collected data from the questions included in sectoral
surveys. Notably, our analysis of answers to survey questions suggests that the
specific issues that drive the sentiment-return relationship differ between sectors.
While expectations about productions and order levels predict returns in both
Manufacturing and Retail Trade sectors, employment expectations constitute an
important factor in predicting Construction sector returns. In contrast, sentiment
for lagged business development sentiment is more significant in the Services sector.
These results support our general conclusion that the strength and significance of
the relationship between sentiment and stock returns varies between sectors.
Taken together, the findings of this study have implications for practition-
ers, policy-makers, regulators and portfolio managers whose decisions depend on
and/or are affected by movements of stock prices. Our evidence indicates that
sector-specific sentiment influences stock returns and stock returns in turn affect
investor sentiment, in the form of consumer confidence and managerial sentiment.
However, the relationship varies across sectors. For practitioners, our results sug-
gest that asset allocation and fund management strategies might take account of
both managerial sentiment and their impact on sector returns. Such information
might be obtained by scrutinizing channels of information from management to
markets such as trading statements, corporate reports, news announcements and
interviews with managers. Regulators might consider how their policies with re-
spect to capital and credit allocation might be received by managers in particular
sectors. Such sentiment, in our study at least, affects stock pricing and thus con-
tributes to pricing anomalies which can have serious consequences for investors
and markets. Further research might consider how sector-specific sentiment con-
tributes to pricing bubble formation or, from a more pecuniary perspective, how
to exploit the effects identified in this chapter in a trading strategy.
38
Chapter 2: Managerial Sentiment, Consumer Confidence and Sector Returns
Appendix 1: Sample questions of sectors surveys
1- Manufacturing confidence indicator
Q. Do you consider your current overall order books to be...?
[more than sufficient , sufficient , not sufficient ]
Q. How do you expect your production to develop over the next 3 months? It
will...
[increase, remain unchanged, decrease]
2- Construction confidence indicator
Q. Do you consider your current overall order books to be...?
[more than sufficient (above normal), sufficient (normal for the season), not
sufficient (below normal)]
Q. How do you expect your firm’s total employment to change over the next 3
months? It will...
[increase, remain unchanged, decrease]
3- Services confidence indicator and financial services confidence
indicator
Q. How has your business situation developed over the past 3 months? It has . . .
[improved, remained unchanged, deteriorated]
Q. How do you expect the demand (turnover) for your company’s services to
change over the next 3 months? It will. . .
[increase, remain unchanged, decrease]
4- Consumer confidence indicator
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Q. How do you expect the financial position of your household to change over the
next 12 months? It will...
[get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, get a lot
worse, don’t know]
Q. How do you expect the general economic situation in this country to develop
over the next 12 months? It will...
[get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, get a lot
worse, don’t know]
Q. How do you expect the number of people unemployed in this country to
change over the next 12 months? The number will...
[increase sharply, increase slightly, remain the same, fall slightly, fall sharply,
don’t know]
Q. Over the next 12 months, how likely is it that you save any money?
[very likely, fairly likely, not likely, not at all likely, don’t know] Retail trade
confidence indicator
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Appendix 2: Construction of confidence indica-
tors
Confidence indicators are calculated using Scores that summarize replies to
surveys questions. Percentage of responses to any single question should follow:
PP + P + E +N +NN +M = 100 (2.5)
where:
PP is very positive, P is positive, E is neutral, N is negative, NN is very negative
and M is without any opinion.
Scores then are calculated as:
Score = (PP +
1
2
P )− (1
2
N +NN) (2.6)
The score of a question is ranged from -100 if all respondents choose the
negative option to +100 if all respondents choose the positive option. Scores
are seasonally adjusted using ”Dainties” as the seasonal-adjustment algorithm.
For each sector, the confidence indicator is the simple arithmetic average of all
seasonally adjusted scores of questions.
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Appendix 3: Autocorrelation function for level
and differenced series
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Figure 2.5: Correlogram of confidence indicators at both level
and differenced values
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Figure 2.6: Correlogram of returns at both level and
differenced values
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Appendix 4: Cross-correlation function between
sentiment indices and returns
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Figure 2.7: Sentiment and returns cross correlation function
The x and y axes represents the number of lags used and the correlation
coefficient respectively. The graph shows the correlation between investor
sentiment Sentt+k and stock returns Rt . Positive lags on the x axis means R
leads Sent and the negative lags means Sent leads R. The dashed line shows
the 5 % significance level.
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Appendix 5: Construction of the Managerial Sen-
timent Indicator (MSI)
The Managerial Sentiment Indicator (MSI) covers four business surveys of
the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI). The original weights of indicators in
the ESI are 40% to Manufacturing, 30% to Services, 20% Consumer and 5% for
each of the Retail Trade and Construction indicators. After the exclusion of the
consumer confidence indicator, we redistribute the 20% pro rata based on the
original distribution. This results in 50% to Manufacturing, 37.5% to Services,
and 6.25% for each of the Retail Trade and Construction indicators.
For the Services sector, the indicator has no values until April 2006. Therefore,
the MSI is constructed using only three sectors for the period from January 1985
to March 2006. The percentage redistributed to the weights of the three sectors
is 50% (%20 from the consumer confidence indicator and 30% from the Services
indicator). The weights for this period are 80% to Manufacturing, 10% to each
of the Construction and Retail Trade indicators. These adjustments maintain
the ratio of Services weight to Manufacturing weight at 0.75 and Construction
and Retail Trade weights to Manufacturing weight at 0.125 for ESI and MSI.
Following the same methodology used by the EC in constructing the ESI, the MSI
is scaled to have a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 10.
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3.1. Introduction
Investor sentiment has received a substantial attention in finance literature
since Statman & Solt (1988) studied the usefulness of The Bearish Sentiment In-
dex published by Investor Intelligence. They argued that the power of the index
in forecasting stock returns is not better than what can be predicted by chance.
They claimed that existence of errors in investors’ cognition is what justifies persis-
tence reliance on the index by investors. However, a subsequent strand of studies
concerned with how investor sentiment is measured provided evidence on how it
affects stock market returns (Abraham et al., 1993; Baker & Wurgler, 2006; Da
et al., 2015; Lee et al., 1991). Furthermore, Salhin et al. (2016) argued that man-
agerial sentiment predicts aggregate market and sector returns and the prediction
power depends primarily on characteristics of each sector grouping. In this chap-
ter, we build on Salhin et al. (2016) study by constructing a composite managerial
sentiment index based on significant characteristics of four sector groupings which
we call Core Managerial Sentiment Index (CMSI). We used the index to test its
performance in predicting stock market returns compared to competing indices of
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investor sentiment. In addition, we test the transmission between managerial and
investor sentiments and more importantly, we provide evidence on the polarity of
sentiment transmitted from managers to investors.
Studying the impact of investor sentiment on finance and investment decisions
raises a question of how to measure investor sentiment. Since investor sentiment
is not directly observable, it has been measured using several proxies including
closed-end fund discount, mutual fund flow, investor surveys, volatility indices
and composite sentiment indices (Baker & Wurgler, 2006; Frazzini & Lamont,
2008; Lee et al., 1991; Whaley, 2000). Other studies used consumer confidence as
another possible measure for investor sentiment (Fisher & Statman, 2003; Jansen
& Nahuis, 2003; Otoo, 1999; Schmeling, 2009). They showed how consumer con-
fidence can negatively forecasts stock market returns and they argued for its ap-
propriateness as a measure of investor sentiment. However, Ferrer et al. (2016)
argued that consumer confidence is an inappropriate proxy for investor sentiment.
Their finding is also confirmed by Salhin et al. (2016) who showed that consumer
confidence lacks the predictive power of stock market returns. However, they pro-
vided evidence on the performance of managerial sentiment as a better predictor
of aggregate market and sector returns.
In our view, using investor, consumer and managerial sentiments interchange-
ably provides misleading and confusing results. Individuals are distinct in their
nature and the process of aggregating their sentiments is based on common char-
acteristics they share as consumers, managers or investors. The overlap between
agent groups provides an appealing justification to use their measure of sentiment
interchangeably since all managers and investors are consumers and some man-
agers could be also investors and vice versa. This overlap is also confirmed by the
correlation between sentiment/confidence indicators related to each agent as in
Salhin et al. (2016) and in what we report in a subsequent section. However, the
majority of information gathered from each group when polling for their opinions
or when monitoring their investment behavior is different. For example, while in-
vestor surveys focus on evaluation of stock market performance, consumer surveys
enquire about consumer prices and managerial surveys are more concerned with
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business activities.1 In addition, there are different factors that affect sentiment
of each group of market participants. For instance, Tetlock (2007) shows that me-
dia content, such as news about the stock market, influences investor sentiment.
Alternatively, Lahiri & Zhao (2013) show that media news is less important in
determining consumer sentiment than their expectations about economy, prices,
income and unemployment.
Moreover, using market participant sentiment indicators interchangeably di-
minishes the possibility of studying how they relate and impact each other. Ac-
cording to Baker & Wurgler (2013), managers tend to cater for investor sentiment
through various corporate actions. For instance, evidence shows that managers
use pro forma earnings disclosures and other corporate activities to cater for in-
vestor sentiment. (see, e.g., Baker et al. (2003); Brown et al. (2012); Cooper et al.
(2001)).
In this chapter, we define managerial sentiment as judgment about business
conditions that is expressed through managers’ feelings. We distinguish between
investor and managerial sentiment to achieve two main objectives. The first ob-
jective is to test the strength of managerial sentiment in predicting stock market
returns compared to investor sentiment. Our expectation is that managerial senti-
ment is a better predictor of stock returns since managers have informed opinions
on prospects of their businesses compared to investors. Our second objective is to
test whether managerial sentiment is transmitted to investors and, if so, whether
the transmission is asymmetric between positive and negative sentiment.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follow: section 2 reviews relevant
literature. Section 3 presents data and summary statistics. In section 4, we com-
pare the predictive power of managerial sentiment and several proxies for investor
sentiment. Section 5, we investigate the relationship between investor and man-
agerial sentiment. Section 6 investigates the asymmetric sentiment transmission
from managers to investors. Section 7 concludes.
1 Qiu & Welch (2006) provide discussion on investor sentiment surveys. More information on
consumer and business surveys is available in the Joint Harmonized EU Programme of Business
and Consumer Surveys guide available at http://ec.europa.eu, accessed on 27 January 2017.
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3.2. Literature review
3.2.1 Investor sentiment
Rationality of individual behaviour is a central assumption in theories of fi-
nancial market economics. Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) by Fama (1970) is
one theory that assumes investor rationality. It claims that prices in the market
are accurate and reflect all available information about assets. If prices are driven
away from their fundamental values, arbitrageurs are able to exploit the difference
between current and fundamental prices and bring prices back to equilibrium. On
the other hand, early studies of investor sentiment such as Bondt (1998); Lee et al.
(1991); Sanders et al. (1997) consider arbitrage to be costly and not profitable.
Thus, assets will be consistently mispriced.
Furthermore, some anomalies in the financial market cannot be understood
under the traditional EMH. One of these anomalies is the closed-end funds discount
puzzle. Closed-end funds are traded class of assets whose share price is determined
by forces of demand and supply. These funds invest in different classes of assets
along with bearing some liabilities. The net value of funds’ assets and liabilities
called “net asset value” or NAV. According to the EMH, share prices of closed-end
funds should almost equal its NAV per share to reflect all available information
about the fund. However, there is usually a difference known as the discount. Lee
et al. (1991) argue that closed-end fund discount is a reflection of investor sentiment
in the market. They find that movement of closed-end fund discounts is correlated
with small companies’ stocks held by individual investors whose decisions are more
likely to be affected by sentiment. Their result has been supported by work of
Bodurtha et al. (1995); Chen et al. (2003); Noronha & Rubin (1995).
Baker & Wurgler (2007, p. 129) defined investor sentiment as “a belief about
future cash flows and investment risks that is not justified by facts at hand”.
If investors base their investment decisions on this belief, asset prices will be
driven away from their fundamental values. Furthermore, investor sentiment costs
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the market by increasing probability of bubble formation. For example, Alan
Greenspan, former chairman of the US Federal Reserve used the term “Irrational
Exuberance” to warn of the formation of dot.com bubble (Shiller, 2015). Zouaoui
et al. (2011) shows that investor sentiment increases the likelihood of a stock
market crisis. In addition, Berger & Turtle (2015) confirm a link between investor
sentiment and asset bubbles.
Various studies of investor irrationality have investigated the relationship be-
tween stock market returns and changes in investor sentiment. These studies have
produced two notable results. First is the identification of measures which proxy
for the true unobservable level of sentiment. Second is the identification of the
shape of the relationship between investor sentiment and stock returns. Examples
of these studies are (Abraham et al. (1993); Baker & Wurgler (2006); Beaumont
et al. (2008); Chang et al. (2007); Eichengreen & Mody (1998); Fisher & Statman
(2000); Lee et al. (1991); Neal & Wheatley (1998); Statman & Solt (1988); Wang
(2003)).
Measures of investor sentiment used to examine its impact on financial mar-
kets include closed-end fund discount Lee et al. (1991), investor and consumer
surveys (Bathia et al. (2016); Hwang (2011); Jansen & Nahuis (2003); Lemmon &
Portniaguina (2006); Otoo (1999); Schmeling (2009)), mutual fund flows (Bathia
& Bredin (2013); Brown et al. (2003); Frazzini & Lamont (2008)), and volatility
index (Nikkinen & Va¨ha¨maa (2010); Whaley (2000)). In addition, some studies
have used composite sentiment indices that combine different measures (Baker
& Wurgler (2006); Brown & Cliff (2004)). Using these measures, stock market
returns are found to be affected by aggregate investor sentiment in the market.
3.2.2 Managerial sentiment
The debate of rationality vs irrationality has also taken its place in studying
managers’ decisions. The notion of “smart managers’ refers to claims that man-
agers are able to identify any mispricings that is created by irrational investor.
Baker & Wurgler (2013) supported these claims in several ways; for example,
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managers possess superior information on their own businesses, therefore they can
distinguish fundamental value of their shares from observed market price. In addi-
tion, they can impact share prices through manufactured information that affects
investors demand. On contrary, Ben-David et al. (2013) show that top financial
managers are “severely miscalibrated” in the sense that they systematically under-
estimate the range of stock market returns as well as prospects of their own firms.
Furthermore, studies show that managers, like investors, are prone to several be-
havioural biases such as overconfidence (e.g., Ben-David et al. (2013); Hribar &
Yang (2015); Malmendier & Tate (2005, 2008); Pikulina et al. (2017)), disposition
effect (e.g., Crane & Hartzell (2010)), anchoring (e.g., Baker & Wurgler (2013)),
and loss-aversion (e.g., Shefrin (2001)).
Measures of managerial sentiment/optimism have varied across studies. Sal-
hin et al. (2016) used a survey based measure of managerial sentiment developed
by the European Commission. They found that managerial sentiment is a good
predictor of stock returns at an aggregate and sectors level. In particular, they
found that the aggregate sentiment-return relationship is mainly driven by senti-
ment associated with the Manufacturing industry. Moreover, Jiang et al. (2015)
developed a managerial sentiment index by quantifying the textual tone of financial
statements and conference calls. They showed that managerial sentiment outper-
forms investor sentiment and macroeconomic factors in predicting stock market
returns.
3.2.3 Catering theory
Baker & Wurgler (2013) define catering as “any actions intended to boost
share prices above fundamental value”. Under catering theory, managers deliber-
ately involve in activities that affect investors short term demand. For example,
Subramanyam (1996) finds a positive correlation between unexpected accruals and
stock returns. Managers are found to use discretionary accruals as signals of pri-
vate information to investors. Furthermore, Hribar et al. (2017) examined the
relationship between managerial sentiment and accrual estimates. They observe
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that estimates for loan loss provisions are negatively associated with managerial
sentiment. However, Louis & Robinson (2005) argue that findings regarding the
association between managerial sentiment and discretionary accruals do not in-
dicate deliberate actions from managers to influence investors’ decisions. Rather
they indicate that managerial actions are unintentionally affected by the level of
optimism that managers have towards future earnings and do not indicate any
opportunism. Nevertheless, their argument does not fit corporate disclosures that
managers report voluntarily. For example, Brown, Christensen. Elliott (2006)
found that managers are likely to report favorable pro forma earnings measures
in periods with higher levels of investor sentiment. In addition, they show that
managers’ catering for investor sentiment is more noticeable for companies whose
stock prices are more prone to sentiment. Furthermore, if corporate actions are
determined by managerial sentiment and do not intended to cater for investor sen-
timent, we would expect no impact of market sentiment on firms’ management.
However, Bochkay & Dimitrov (2014) provided an evidence on the impact of in-
vestor sentiment on managerial sentiment. They found that investor sentiment
explains 37.7% of the variation in managerial sentiment and managers are likely
to be optimistic (pessimistic) when investor sentiment is high (low). Such findings
are in support of the catering theory that managerial actions are intended to affect
short-term pricing of companies’ stocks.
3.3. Data and preliminary tests
3.3.1 Investor sentiment
To test our expectations of the predictive power and symmetry of transmission
of managerial sentiment, we use the closed-end fund discount (CEFD), the number
of initial public offerings (NIPOs) and the FTSE 100 Volatility Index (VFTSEIX)
as proxies for investor sentiment.
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3.3.1.1 Closed-end fund discount (CEFD)
Performance of closed-end funds is mainly determined by the value of their
net assets (total assets minus total liabilities) which is disclosed on a per share
basis called Net Asset Value (NAV). However, closed-end fund shares are traded
for a price that is determined by forces of supply and demand. The difference
between NAV and price per share is called a discount which provides an indicator
of investors sentiment towards the stock market.
Following Lee et al. (1991) we calculated a monthly value-weighted index of
discounts (CEFD) as follow:
CEFDt =
nt∑
i=1
Wi DISCit, (3.1)
where, Wi =
NAV it∑nt
i=1NAV it
, NAVit is the net asset value of fund i at the end of
month t.
DISCit=
NAV it− Pit
NAV it
X 100, Pit is the share price of fund i at the end of month t.
nt is the number of funds with available P and NAV at the end of month t.
As reported in Table 3.1, the average discount for the UK is 7.1% indicating
lower investor sentiment towards the stock market during the period from January
2000 to September 2014.
3.3.1.2 Number of initial public offerings (NIPOs)
Investor sentiment is often associated with the demand for initial public of-
ferings. Higher number of initials public offerings indicates investors’ enthusiasm
and vice versa. Data for IPOs is obtained from London Stock Exchange with total
number of 2054 IPOs for our entire sample period, with low figures during and
after the financial crisis of 2008-2009 as shown in Figure 3.1.
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Table 3.1
Descriptive statistics sentiment, returns and macroeconomic indices.
Data covers the period from January 2000 to September 2014 for the UK mar-
ket. Sentiment indices are closed-end fund discount (CEFD), UK stock market
volatility (VFTSEIX), number of Initial Public Offerings (NIPOs), and core man-
agerial sentiment index (CMSI). FTSE100, FTALLSH and FTSESCO represent
excess returns of FTSE100, FTSE All Share and FTSE SmallCap indices above
the three-month interest rate. Market return index calculated as the weighted
average returns of all UK listed companies in each month minus the three-month
interest rate. Term-spread is the difference in yields between 10-Year governmental
bonds and 3-Month Treasury bill (T-bill). IPT, INF, GDP are percentage change
in industrial production level, inflation rate and GDP growth rate, respectively.
Panel A: Sentiment
mean sd median trimmed min max
NIPOs 11.6 10.48 8.00 10.1 0.00 52.00
CEFD 7.10 2.75 6.98 7.00 1.47 15.54
VFTSEIX 2.94 0.37 2.92 2.93 2.29 3.85
CMSI 95.48 12.00 98.3 96.88 55.1 111.8
Panel B: Returns
mean sd median trimmed min max
FTSE100 -2.57 5.04 -2.28 -2.50 -17.38 11.96
FTALLSH -2.51 5.07 -2.26 -2.42 -17.33 11.66
FTSESCO -2.36 6.04 -1.81 -2.21 -23.27 25.17
Market -1.70 4.70 -1.90 -1.77 -11.31 8.55
Panel C: Macro-economic Indices
mean sd median trimmed min max
T-bill 2.97 2.15 3.82 2.96 0.23 5.96
Term-spread 1.09 1.31 0.93 1.02 -0.71 3.60
IPT -0.07 0.98 0.00 -0.03 -4.68 2.60
INF 2.23 1.07 2.00 2.13 0.50 5.20
GDP 0.44 0.66 0.57 0.54 -2.20 1.42
3.3.1.3 FTSE100 Volatility Index (VFTSEIX)
Volatility Index (VFTSEIX) is the implied standard deviation of options on
FTSE100 Index. VFTSEIX represents how certain or uncertain investors are
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about stock market volatility, with higher values indicate low sentiment or pes-
simistic investor. Measures of investor sentiment are highly correlated as shown
in Table 3.2.
3.3.2 Managerial sentiment
We use managerial sentiment data from business surveys provided by the
European Commission on monthly basis and conducted nationally by the Con-
federation of British Industry (CBI) and Experian (EXP). We obtain survey data
that covers the period from January 2000 till September 2014 for four sectors
groupings namely Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade, and Services.
Salhin et al. (2016) provide evidence on the impact of managerial sentiment
on stock market returns across different sectors. They show that the sentiment-
returns relationship is sensitive to distinct characteristics of each sector. For ex-
ample, while managerial expectations regarding production/order levels are im-
portant predictors of sector returns in Manufacturing and Retail Trade sectors,
forecasting power of expectations about employment levels is strong in Construc-
tion sector. We use their results to select survey questions in order to construct
a Core Managerial Sentiment Index (CMSI) that reflect significant characteristics
of each sector. Details on the construction of the CMSI is provided in details in
Appendix 1.
3.3.3 Return indices
To compare the impact of investor and managerial sentiment on stock market
returns, we use FTSE100, FTSE All Share (FTALLSH) and FTSE SmallCap
(FTSESCO) indices. We included FTSESCO Index as smaller companies are
expected to be more prone to investor sentiment than bigger companies (Baker &
Wurgler, 2006). In addition to the three indices, we construct a value-weighted
return index (Market) by incorporating data for all UK companies - including listed
and delisted companies - to minimize the impact of survivorship bias. Returns are
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Figure 3.1: Sentiment and stock market return indices
All indices are monthly data covers the period from January 2000 to
September 2014. Sentiment indices are NIPOs is the number of initial
public offerings, CEFD is the closed-end fund discount, VFTSEIX is
the implied volatility of options on FTSE100 Index. Stock returns
indices are FTSE100, FTSE All Share, FTSE SmallCap and Market
index represent all companies listed on London Stock Exchange in
each month.
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winsorized at 0.5% level to remove the effect of outliers. Return indices, stock
prices and market value data are obtained from Datastream for the period from
January 2000 to September 2014.
3.3.4 Macroeconomic variables
We use a set of macroeconomic series as control variables when testing the
relationship between sentiment indicators. Variables include three-month treasury
bill (T-bill), Term spread; defined as the difference between the yield on 10 years
government bonds and T-bill, change in total index of production (IPT), inflation
(INF) and GDP growth rate (GDP). Monthly data on macroeconomic variables
are obtained from Datastream except GDP which is only available in quarterly
form. Therefore, we use polynomial interpolation to transform GDP data into
monthly figures. Figure 3.2 illustrates macroeconomic variables and details on
data sources are provides on Table 3.3.
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Figure 3.2: Macroeconomic indices
All indices are monthly data covers the period from January 2000 to
September 2014. Term-spread is the difference in the yields between
10-Year and 3-Month Treasury bill (T-bill). IPT, INF, GDP are
percentage change in industrial production level, inflation rate and
the GDP growth rate, respectively.
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Table 3.3
Data sources of investor and managerial sentiment, stock returns and macroe-
conomic variables
Variables Data Sources Notes
Closed-end fund
discount
(CEFD)
Datastream Data on prices and net asset value
are obtained on all UK investment
companies on each month including
funds that disappeared on subsequent
months to minimise survivorship bias.
Number of IPOs
(NIPOs)
London Stock
Exchange
Data include the IPOs issued for the
main UK market (1384 IPOs), the
AIM market (655 IPOs) and Specialist
Fund Segment (5 IPOs).
FTSE100
Volatility Index
(VFTSEIX)
Datastream Data type on Datastream is
“ VFTSEIX”.
Core Managerial
Sentiment Index
(CMSI)
European
Commission
Although the index covers only 4 sec-
tors (Manufacturing, Construction, Re-
tail Trade and Services), classification
of economic activities in the European
Community (NACE Rev. 2) covered
by those sectors overlaps with other
industries covered by the Industrial
Classification Benchmark 2.
Return Indices Datastream Total number of companies used to
construct the Market return index
equals 7370 company over the sam-
pling period.
Macroeconomic
variables
Datastream Our choice of macro variables follows
Schmeling (2009).
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3.3.5 Preliminary tests
We examine whether sentiment, returns and macroeconomic time series are
unit-root non-stationary using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Philips-Perron
(PP) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests. Table 3.4 reports all
tests for level and differenced data. Test of non-stationary has shown the following
series are unit root non-stationary: CEFD, CMSI, T-bill, Term-spread, and INF.
Other series are stationary and have I(0) order. The impact of test results on
specifications of our models will be discussed in details in subsequent sections.
Table 3.4
Unit root tests.
Tests are based on 360 observations for all variables except Services sector which
has 104 observations. Models used for unit root test specified to include the
intercept with lags of the variable. Lag length for Augmanted Dicky-Fuller (ADF)
tests are determined by Akaike Information Criterion with maximum of twelve
lags differences. Newey-West procedure is used to calculate bandwidths for both
Philips-Perron (PP) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests. For
spectral estimation, Bartlett’s kernel is used.
Level Differenced
ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS
IPOs -4.5948 -6.2035 0.4898 -17.7861 -24.1278 0.0141
CEFD -1.9086 -2.5327 0.1478 -11.1586 -18.4326 0.0400
VFTSEIX -3.2394 -3.2494 0.1330 -11.3000 -14.7949 0.0274
CMSI -1.5832 -1.9255 0.3155 -8.5204 -14.6146 0.1115
FTSE100 -6.8787 -10.8835 0.8715 -16.7236 -34.5728 0.0046
FTALLSH -6.8179 -10.6134 0.8369 -16.6984 -33.1240 0.0048
FTSESCO -6.9119 -8.9355 0.6194 -16.3741 -24.2538 0.0075
Market -7.1764 -11.0787 0.7590 -17.8065 -33.5390 0.0045
T-bill3M -1.3388 -1.0462 1.0140 -5.6253 -6.8106 0.2430
T-Spread -1.5800 -1.4032 0.7073 -7.8906 -9.7342 0.1356
IPT -10.7194 -16.2513 0.0559 -18.0769 -41.8966 0.0025
INF -2.2437 -2.3008 0.8495 -7.9032 -11.3632 0.1608
GDP -5.4574 -2.8496 0.2516 -12.6999 -4.8027 0.0994
2 More details are available in the Joint Harmonized EU Programme of Business and Consumer
Surveys guide available at http://ec.europa.eu, accessed on 27 January 2017.
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3.4. Investor sentiment, managerial sentiment and
stock returns
For interest of comparison, we test the relationship between investor senti-
ment, managerial sentiment and stock returns by employing the following Granger
causality model (Granger, 1988):
Rett = αr +
k∑
i =1
βriRett−i +
k∑
i=1
γri∆Sentt−i + εrt, (3.2)
∆Sentt = αs +
k∑
i =1
βsi∆Sentt−i +
k∑
i=1
γsiRett−i + εst, (3.3)
where Rett denotes returns at time t ; Sentt is investor/managerial sentiment
indicator at time t ; ∆ is the first difference of the series; k is the maximal lag; and
εrt is an error term. Sentiment (Sent) Granger-causes returns if returns (Ret) can
be better predicted using histories of both sentiment and returns than by using
history of returns alone.
As shown in Table 3.5, all sentiment indicators predict stock market returns,
however, their predictive power is sensitive to the return index used. CEFD can
only predict FTSE SmallCap return index. The results are not surprising since
fund discounts tend to co-move with small companies share prices (Lee et al.,
1991). On the other hand, results for IPOs is affected by the performance of
firms that exited the market since it only predicts the Market index. Furthermore,
findings indicate that our managerial sentiment index (CMSI) outperform investor
sentiment indicators across all stock market return indices, particularly FTSE
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SmallCap Index3. These results highlight the importance of managerial “informed-
sentiment” compared to investors sentiment in predicting stock market returns.
Table 3.5
p-values for Granger causality tests for sentiment and aggregate market re-
turns.
This table presents the p-value for Granger causality tests for sentiment indica-
tors and stock return indices. The results cover the period from January 2000 to
September 2014. r, g-cause, and sent denote return, Granger-cause, and senti-
ment, respectively.
FTSE100 FTALLSH FTSESCO Market
IPOs 0.5642 0.5049 0.4967 0.0260
(r g-cause sent) (0.7403) (0.7610) (0.5204) (0.9473)
CEFD 0.7211 0.5800 0.0684 0.7434
(r g-cause sent) (0.0051) (0.0049) (0.0002) (0.0123)
VFTSEIX 0.0009 0.0020 0.1479 0.0004
(r g-cause sent) (0.7910) (0.7979) (0.4309) (0.9178)
CMSI 0.0024 0.0013 0.0000 0.0028
(r g-cause sent) (0.0261) (0.0228) (0.2889) (0.1440)
3.5. The relationship between managerial and in-
vestor sentiments
In this section, we start analysing the relationship between managerial and
investor sentiments. In fact, the relationship between managerial and investor sen-
timents run in both directions through catering and market timing mechanisms.
According to Baker & Wurgler (2013), catering refers to managerial actions in-
tended to drive share prices above their fundamental values (e.g dividend decla-
ration, corporate reports, press release. . . etc.). On the contrary, market timing
refers to managerial decisions intended to take advantage of temporary mispricing
by issuing (repurchasing) overvalued (undervalued) shares. Since market timing
3 FTSE SmallCap consists of companies that their sizes are not large enough to qualify them to
be included in the FTSE350. Since managers’ surveys are conducted on a sample of 3550
companies according to Salhin et al. (2016), we conclude that majority of this sample are
businesses which their size corresponds to the size of FTSE SmallCap constituents. More
information on the construction of FTSE indices are available at http://www.ftse.com,
accessed on 3 February 2017.
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theory mainly concerns with managers’ financing decisions which are not covered
by managerial sentiment surveys, we focus only on the direction from managerial
sentiment to investor sentiment. We used VFTSEIX as our measure of investor
sentiment based on its performance in predicting majority of our return indices as
shown in Table 3.5.
Baker & Wurgler (2013) and Schmeling (2009) used a set of control variables to
roll out the impact of macro risk factors while estimating the relationship between
investor sentiment and stock returns. We followed the same approach to examine
the impact of managerial sentiment on investor sentiment. Specifically, we em-
ployed a vector autoregressive model with exogenous variables (VARX) to include
short-term interest rates (T-bill), term spread (Term-spread), unemployment rate
(UNEMP), total industrial production (IPT), inflation (INF), and growth rate of
gross domestic product (GDP). In addition, we added stock market return index
(FTSE100) as an explanatory variable to control for investor sentiment that re-
sults from current and past performance of the stock market. The VARX model
translates into:
SENT t = φ0 +
p∑
i=1
φiCMSI t−i +
s∑
j=0
βjψt−j + υt, (3.4)
where SENT t is investor sentiment at time t measured by the volatility index
(VFTSEIX), CMSI t−i is managerial sentiment index at time t-i, ψt−j is a matrix
includes macro variables and stock market return index, φ0 is and intercept and φi
is VAR coefficients, βj is κ x m coefficient matrices, and υt is the disturbance term.
The orders p and s are non-negative integers denote number of lags for endogenous
and exogenous variables and are determined by the sequential Chi square test of
Tiao and Box (1981).
Results in Table 3.6 show a significant impact of managerial sentiment on
investor sentiment. The influence of managerial sentiment on investor sentiment
could follow either of two scenarios; the first is that investors form their sentiment
based on rational expectations on prospects of their investments in isolation of
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managerial sentiment. Similarly, managerial sentiment is also based on rational
expectations but with a time advantage due to managers’ ability to access business
information. Therefore, the impact of managerial sentiment on investor sentiment
under this scenario is illusionary and it exist only due to an “information lag”
between investors and managers. A challenge to this scenario lies in the common
definition of investor sentiment as a belief about future cash flows and risks that is
not supported by facts at hand (Baker & Wurgler, 2007). Consequently, investor
sentiment is not formed based on rational expectations or fundamental news. Fur-
thermore, if investor sentiment is based on fundamental information, we would
expect it to have no significant impact on stock market returns according to the
Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970).
Table 3.6
Effects of Managerial sentiment on investor sentiment
Figures represents results from vector autoregressive model with exogenous vari-
ables (VARX). Variables are investor sentiments (SENT), managerial sentiment
(CMSI), stock market return index (FTSE100), short-term interest rates (T-bill),
term spread (Term-spread), total industrial production (IPT), inflation (INF), and
growth in gross domestic product (GDP). Lags for the model are determined by
the sequential chi square test of Tiao and Box (1981) for multivariate timer series.
Dependent Variable: Investor Sentiments (SENTt))
Estimate Standard
Error
t-stat p-value
Intercept -0.8991 0.2154 -4.1743 0.0000
CMSIt−1 -0.0039 † 0.0014 2.6965 0.0077
SENTt−1 0.7711 0.0367 20.9998 0.0000
FTSE100 0.0263 0.0025 10.3317 0.0000
T-bill 0.0776 0.0873 0.8886 0.3754
Term-spread 0.0521 0.0691 0.7542 0.4517
IPT 0.0146 0.0115 1.2728 0.2048
INF 0.0219 0.0358 0.6100 0.5426
GDP 0.0521 0.0641 0.8137 0.4169
FTSE100t−1 0.0026 0.0027 0.9306 0.3533
T-billt−1 -0.0759 0.0883 -0.8596 0.3912
Term-spreadt−1 -0.0859 0.0685 -1.2544 0.2114
IPTt−1 0.0089 0.0112 0.7951 0.4276
Inflationt−1 -0.0306 0.0370 -0.8280 0.4088
GDPt−1 -0.0774 0.0644 -1.2018 0.2311
†Negative coefficient means a positive relationship between managerial and in-
vestor sentiment since the proxy for investor sentiment (VFTSEIX) has a reverse
relationship with sentiment.
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Fig. 2: Macroeconomic indices: all indices are monthly data covers the period from January 2000 to 
September 2014. Term-spread is the difference in the yields between 10-Year and 3-Month Treasury 
bill (T-bill). IPT, INF, GDP are percentage change in industrial production level, inflation rate and the 
GDP growth rate respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 3: An illustration of the path from company fundamentals to stock market returns. 
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of the path from company fundamentals
to stock market returns.
The second scenario is that managers send signals to investors through various
corporate actions, i.e. catering for investor sentiment. In catering theory, Baker
& Wurgler (2013) argued that managers’ goal is to cater for short-term investors
demand in attempt to influence any temporary mispricing. Therefore, this scenario
provides an evidence on the success of managers in achieving their ‘catering” goals.
In addition, it offers more justification to the impact of managerial sentiment on
stock returns since managers do not directly trade in the stock market, and if
they do, their ability to affect stock prices is minimal compared to investors. We
provide an illustration of the path from information and sentiment to stock market
returns for both scenarios in Figure 3.3.
3.6. Asymmetric sentiment transmission from man-
agers to investors
As a robustness test and to further examine the relationship between manage-
rial and investor sentiment, we used a composite measure of investor sentiment.
Baker & Wurgler (2006) argued that individual measures of investor sentiment
include components that is related to sentiment as well as other idiosyncratic,
65
Chapter 3: Sentiment Transmission between Managers and Investors
Feb 00 Feb 02 Feb 04 Feb 06 Feb 08 Feb 10 Feb 12 Feb 14
−
4
−
3
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
3
Investor Sentiment Index (ISENT)
Figure 3.4: A composite measure of investor sentiment
The measure is constructed using Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) of the Number of Initial Public Offerings (NIPOs), Closed-end
Fund Discount (CEFD), and Volatility Index (VFTSEIX).
non-sentiment components. They used principal component analysis (PCA) to
construct a composite measure of investor sentiment which reflects the common
sentiment-related component of different measures. We follow their methodology
to construct an investor sentiment index (ISENT) from NIPOs, CEFD, and VFT-
SEIX measures. Details on the methodology applied are provided in Appendix
2.
As shown in Figure 3.4, our composite index demonstrates same pattern re-
flected by the underlying measures of sentiment as well as the core managerial
sentiment index (CMSI). The correlation between ISENT and CMSI is 0.69 and
it is statistically significant at 1% significance level. To examine the relationship
between investor and managerial sentiment we started by applying unit root tests
on ISENT. Similar to CMSI, results show that ISENT is a unit root non-stationary
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series I (1) indicating the possibility that both series share a common stochastic
trend. Therefore, we extended our preliminary tests to examine the possibility of
co-integration between CMSI and ISENT. Results of Johansen (1991) procedure
and Phillips & Ouliaris (1990) cointegration tests indicate that a combination of
CMSI and ISENT follow a stationary path and have a long-run relationship.
Balke & Fomby (1997) argued that symmetric cointegration model is mis-
specified if there is an asymmetric adjustment to long-run equilibrium (LRE).
Furthermore, we expect managers cater to investor sentiment if only they possess
positive information/sentiment towards the future of their businesses. In other
words, we predict that investor sentiment has an asymmetric response to positive
and negative managerial sentiment. Therefore, we consider a graphical represen-
tation to obtain guidance on the symmetry of the relationship between investor
and managerial sentiment indices. Figure 3.5 indicates an asymmetric behavior
of the relationship between investor and managerial sentiment indices. As shown
by the figure, there is a difference in the magnitude of CMSI and ISENT in pe-
riods when they share same level of sentiment. It shows also a difference in the
speed of adjustments of sentiment indices as indicated by the sharpness of peaks
in positive and negative areas. Therefore, we examined two types of asymmetry
namely; “Deepness” and “Steepness” in order to test the asymmetric relationship
between CMSI and ISENT. According to Sichel (1993), deepness refers to the dif-
ference between positive or negative shocks in the magnitude of divergence from
equilibrium (i.e. how far ISENT diverge from LRE after a positive/negative shock
from CMSI). Steepness refers to the difference in speed of adjustment of the eco-
nomic variable after positive or negative shocks (i.e. how long does it take ISENT
to converge to LRE after a positive/negative shock from CMSI). While deepness
is tested by the threshold autoregressive model (TAR) developed by Enders &
Granger (1998), steepness is tested by the momentum threshold autoregressive
model (MTAR) developed by Enders & Siklos (2001).
To estimate TAR and MTAR models, we start by estimating the LRE rela-
tionship as in the first step of Engle & Granger (1987) two-step methodology:
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Figure 3.5: An area plot of managerial sentiment vs investor
sentiment indices
Each index is scaled to have a mean of zero and standard deviation
of 1.
ISENT t = β0 + β1 CMSI t + µt, (3.5)
where ISENT t is investor sentiment indicator, CMSI t is managerial senti-
ment indicator, β are the estimated parameters and µt is the disturbance term.
ISENT t and CMSI t are I (1) non-stationary series. The following TAR model is
employed to examine the asymmetric adjustment to the LRE relationship:
∆µt = It ρ1 µt−1 + (1− It) ρ2 µt−1 +
p∑
ι=1
γp∆µt−p + ξt (3.6)
where µt is the residual term from Equation (3.5), ρ1 and ρ2 are speed of
adjustment coefficients to test both cointegration and asymmetry in the LRE
relationship, ∆µt−p is the first difference of the residual term at time t− p where
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p is the lag length which is determined using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC),
ξt is the disturbance term and It is the Heaviside indicator function such that:
4
It =
 1, µt−1 ≥ τ0, µt−1 < τ , and τ is the threshold 5 (3.7)
The expected sign for ρ1 and ρ2 in Equation 6 is negative to indicate the
adjustment if µt−1 is above or below its LRE relationship. The model tests the
null hypothesis of whether ρ1 = ρ2, and if rejected, the adjustment to divergence
is asymmetric. If ρ1 > ρ2 > -1, the positive regime of sentiment is more persistent
than a negative regime, assuming magnitudes of positive and negative shocks are
equal. In MTAR specification, the adjustment rate depends on changes in the
residuals in which the It is the Heaviside indicator function will be:
It =
 1, ∆µt−1 ≥ τ0, ∆µt−1 < τ , and τ is the threshold (3.8)
where ∆µt−1 is the first difference of the residuals. In MTAR model, if ρ1
> ρ2 > -1, positive phase tends to be more persistent than a negative regime
irrespective of the disequilibrium magnitude. Results of TAR and MTAR models
are presented in Tables 7 and 8, respectively.
As reported by Table 3.7 and 3.8 , contemporaneous relationship between
managerial sentiment (CMSI) and investor sentiment (ISENT) is positive and
highly significant. Results for TAR model suggest that the long run relationship
between ISENT and CMSI is statistically significant at 10% significance level even
after considering disequilibrium magnitudes that result from positive or negative
shocks. However, the results do not support the existence of a deepness asym-
metry in the LRE relationship between CMSI and ISENT. On contrary, results
4 The reason for including the ∆µt−p term is that residuals from Equation 5 are not
characterised by a white noise process and are serially correlated.
5 We followed Chan (1993) procedures to determine the threshold value. We fitted the regression
model in Equation 3.6 for all possible threshold values and selected the value that minimises
the sum of squared error of the model.
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Table 3.7
TAR (deepness asymmetry) results
LR reports results for Equation 3.5, where the long-run relationship between man-
agerial sentiment (CMSI) and investor sentiment (ISENT) is estimated. CI reports
results for Equation 3.6 where the asymmetric cointegration is examined. As the
table reports the findings of threshold autoregressive model (TAR), identification
of the Heaviside indicator function is provided in Equation 3.7. Lag length for
residuals is determined using Akaike information criterion (AIC).
LR: Dependent Variable: Investor Sentiment (ISENTt)
CI: Dependent Variable: Differenced Residuals (∆µt)
Estimate Standard Error t-stat p-value
LR (Intercept) -7.522 0.596 -12.627 0.000***
LR CMSIt 0.079 0.006 12.726 0.000***
CI µ+t−1 -0.187 0.064 -2.925 0.004***
CI µ−t−1 -0.038 0.079 -0.487 0.627
CI ∆µt−1 -0.237 0.085 -2.785 0.006***
CI ∆µt−2 -0.258 0.085 -3.044 0.003***
CI ∆µt−3 -0.159 0.081 -1.969 0.051*
CI ∆µt−4 0.006 0.077 0.081 0.935
Cointegration: ϕ tatistic for H0: ρ1 = ρ2= 0 equals 4.2807, p-value: 0.0154*
Asymmetry: F statistic for H0: ρ1 = ρ2 equals 2.4736, p-value: 0.1177
Levels of significance are ***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
for MTAR models suggests the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegra-
tion at 1% significance level as indicated by the value of ϕ statistic. The findings
also support the existence of steepness asymmetry in the LRE relationship. Such
results mean that investor sentiment rapidly adjust to positive shocks from man-
agerial sentiment than negative shocks with approximately 20% each month to
converge to the long-run equilibrium relationship between them. They also mean
that managers pay more attention to high investor sentiment regimes than low in-
vestor sentiment regimes. Although the divergence of investor sentiment from the
LRE relationship after a negative shock from managerial sentiment is statistically
insignificant, it may imply that investors are more likely to react, or even panic,
to abnormal deviations in periods characterised by low sentiment. The speed of
such mania is beyond what managers can resolve so it persists for a period of time
until the market restores its previous sentiment status.6 In other words, formation
of financial bubbles is slower than panic from financial crises.
6 These results are apparent in Figure 3.5; the troughs are sharper than peaks.
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Table 3.8
MTAR (steepness asymmetry) results
LR reports results for Equation 3.5 where the long-run relationship between man-
agerial sentiment (CMSI) and investor sentiment (ISENT) is estimated. CI reports
results for Equation 3.6 where the asymmetric cointegration is examined. As the
table reports the findings of momentum threshold autoregressive model (MTAR),
identification of the Heaviside indicator function is provided in Equation 3.8. Lag
length for residuals is determined using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).
LR: Dependent Variable: Investor Sentiment (ISENTt)
CI: Dependent Variable: Differenced Residuals (∆µt)
Estimate Standard Error t-stat p-value
LR (Intercept) -7.522 0.596 -12.627 0.000***
LR CMSIt 0.079 0.006 12.726 0.000***
CI µ+t−1 -0.200 0.057 -3.522 0.001***
CI µ−t−1 0.126 0.100 1.261 0.209
CI ∆µt−1 -0.247 0.084 -2.947 0.004***
CI ∆µt−2 -0.249 0.083 -3.004 0.003***
CI ∆µt−3 -0.155 0.079 -1.962 0.051*
CI ∆µt−4 0.032 0.075 0.422 0.674
Cointegration: ϕ statistic for H0: ρ1 = ρ2= 0 equals 7.6649, p-value: 0.0006***
Asymmetry: F statistic for H0: ρ1 = ρ2 equals 9.0046, p-value: 0.0031**
Levels of significance are ***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
After establishing the asymmetric cointegration between investor and man-
agerial sentiment indices, we investigated short-run dynamics of their relationship.
We used an asymmetric threshold vector error correction model (ATVECM) to
understand whether positive or negative managerial sentiment is transmitted dif-
ferently to investor sentiment. Our model is specified as follow:
∆ISENT t = Γ0 +
p∑
i=1
Γ+1 ∆ISENT
+
t−p +
p∑
i=1
Γ+2 ∆CMSI
+
t−p
+
p∑
i=1
Γ−1 ∆ISENT
−
t−p +
p∑
i=1
Γ−2 ∆CMSI
−
t−p
+ ItΦ
+
1 ECT
+
t−1 + (1− It) Φ−1 ECT−t−1 + νt
(3.9)
where, ISENT and CMSI are investor sentiment and managerial sentiment
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indicators, respectively, Γ0 is the intercept, Γ
+
1 applies when ∆ISENT t−p ≥ 0,
Γ−1 applies when ∆ISENT t−p < 0, Γ
+
2 applies when ∆CMSI t−p ≥ 0, Γ−2 applies
when ∆CMSI t−p < 0, similarly for Φ+1 and Φ
−
1 in the case of error correction term
ECT t−1, It is the Heaviside step function and is specified as in Equation 8, νt is
the error term and p is the lag length.
In Table 3.9 error correction term (ECT) for positive shocks is statistically
significant suggesting that investor sentiment reacts to disequilibrium in the short-
run. The results also show interesting dynamics between managerial and investor
sentiments. In a lag of 4 months, positive managerial sentiment is a negative
predictor of investor sentiment. However, as in Table 3.5 and 3.6, we show that
managerial sentiment has a positive association with investor sentiment at both
time t and t-1. The results imply that managerial sentiment is transmitted posi-
tively to investor sentiment in a very shorter period, however, as time passes and
more information that disconfirms previous managerial beliefs becomes available,
investor sentiment begins to respond negatively. Furthermore, the length of the lag
in which investor sentiment begins to react negatively, i.e. 4 months, is very rea-
sonable in our case. Surveys on managerial sentiment we used to construct CMSI
usually request managers’ expectations on the development of their business activ-
ities in three months’ window. Therefore, as managers are over-confident in their
estimation, we expect higher positive managerial sentiment around time t. For
3-month periods, business results appear below managers’ previous estimations
and hence, low level of investor sentiment.
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Table 3.9
Results of the asymmetric sentiment transmission from managers to investors
ISENT is the investor sentiment index and CMSI is the core managerial sentiment
index. The identification of the Heaviside indicator function is provided in Equa-
tion 8. Lag length for explanatory variable is determined using Akaike information
criterion (AIC).
Dependent Variable: Investor Sentiments (∆ISENTt)
Estimate St. Error t-stat p-value
(Intercept) 0.145 0.174 0.832 0.406
∆CMSI+t−1 -0.016 0.028 -0.562 0.575
∆CMSI+t−2 0.038 0.027 1.408 0.161
∆CMSI+t−3 0.025 0.027 0.912 0.363
∆CMSI+t−4 -0.052 0.027 -1.918 0.057*
∆CMSI−t−1 0.026 0.026 1.012 0.313
∆CMSI−t−2 0.001 0.024 0.028 0.978
∆CMSI−t−3 0.031 0.024 1.284 0.201
∆CMSI−t−4 0.012 0.025 0.487 0.627
∆SENT+t−1 -0.479 0.169 -2.843 0.005***
∆SENT+t−2 -0.13 0.169 -0.77 0.443
∆SENT+t−3 -0.146 0.162 -0.9 0.369
∆SENT+t−4 0.352 0.153 2.296 0.023**
∆SENT−t−1 0.017 0.153 0.113 0.91
∆SENT−t−2 -0.245 0.133 -1.836 0.068*
∆SENT−t−3 0.032 0.137 0.233 0.816
∆SENT−t−4 -0.121 0.133 -0.913 0.363
ECT+t−1 -0.125 0.062 -2.023 0.045**
ECT−t−1 0.135 0.133 1.016 0.311
Level of significance for correlation coefficients are ***:0.01, **:0.05, *:0.1.
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3.7. Conclusion
The chapter examined the relationship between managerial sentiment and
investor sentiment in the UK market. To measure managerial sentiment, we con-
structed a core managerial sentiment index (CMSI) based on Salhin et al. (2016)
findings. Comparing the performance of investor sentiment measures (NIPO,
CEFD and VFTSEIX) to managerial sentiment index, we provided evidence that
managerial sentiment is a powerful predictor of stock market returns and its per-
formance is less sensitive to changes in return indices compared to individual
measures of investor sentiment. We further estimated the impact of investor senti-
ment on managerial sentiment by employing a VARX model. Results showed that
managerial sentiment positively forecasts changes in investor sentiment in shorter
periods.
Moreover, our preliminary cointegration tests indicated a long-run relation-
ship between investor sentiment (ISENT) and managerial sentiment (CMSI). To
further investigate their long-run relationship, we extended our cointegration tests
to allow for the estimation of asymmetric relationship between ISENT and CMSI.
Our findings suggest that investor sentiment responds to positive rather than nega-
tive shocks in managerial sentiment. These results indicate that investor sentiment
converges to the long-run equilibrium relationship when managers possess positive
sentiment towards prospects of their businesses. In addition, we used ATVECM
to provide an evidence on the overconfidence of managers and how it leads to
negative investor sentiment with a lag of four months.
Our study has several important implications. Firstly, it provides investors
with evidence on the importance of managerial sentiment as a powerful predictor
of stock market returns. Managers, despite their over-confidence, have superior
information; therefore, their sentiment is well informed of fundamental changes
compared to investors. Secondly, our results are important for regulators who are
concerned with the relationship between managers and investors. The findings we
provided on long and short-run dynamics in the relationship between managers
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and investors reveals unobserved behaviour of managers in influencing investors
decisions and actions. The results might provide more information on role that
managers play in the formation of pricing bubble. Future research on this area
could be directed to understand the feedback in the relationship from investor to
managerial sentiment. Such research would provide more insights on how managers
views on their businesses are affected by the prevailing market/investor sentiment.
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Appendix 1: Construction of the Core Managerial
Sentiment Indicator (CMSI)
We construct the index from a linear combination of selected survey questions
that show significant prediction of sector returns as documented by Salhin et al.
(2016). The selected questions are reported in Table 3.10.
Table 3.10
Survey questions for constructing the Core Managerial Sentiment Index
The table reports managerial survey questions that show significant power in pre-
dicting sector returns as reported by Salhin et al. (2016).
Sector Questions
Manufacturing • Expectations about the future level of production.
• Assessment of the current order-book levels.
Construction • Evolution of current overall order book.
• Employment expectation in the next 3 months of the
business activity.
Retail Trade • Order expectation in the next 3 months of the business
activity.
Services • Business situation development over the past three
month of the business activity.
• Evolution of demand over the past three month of the
business activity.
• Employment expectation in the next 3 months of the
business activity
Score for every sector is the simple arithmetic mean of the selected questions
as follow:
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CMSIs =
∑n
i=1 Questi
ns
where, CMSIs is the core managerial sentiment indicator for sector s, Questi
is the selected question i for sector s, n is the number of selected questions for
sector s.
The aggregate market CMSI is the weighted average of each sector CMSI as
follow:
CMSI =
4∑
s=1
Ws CMSIs
where CMSI is the core managerial sentiment indicator for the UK market, Ws
is the weight for sector s, CMSIs is the core managerial sentiment indicator for
sector s.
We calculated sector weights following the same methodology by Salhin et al.
(2016) with 50% assigned to Manufacturing, 37.5% to Services, and 6.25% for each
of the Retail Trade and Construction indicators. In addition, the CMSI is scaled
to have a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 10.
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Appendix 2: Construction of the Investor Senti-
ment Index (ISENT)
We follow Baker & Wurgler (2006) procedures to construct a composite index
of investor sentiment (ISENT) using three individual measures of investor senti-
ment; the number of initial public offerings (NIPOs), closed-end funds discounts
(CEFD), and volatility index (VFTSEIX). Firstly, we estimated the first principal
component of the three standardised measures of investor sentiment and their lags.
This results in a first-phase index with six loadings one for each of the current val-
ues of our measures and their lags. We then calculate the correlation coefficient
between the first-phase index and each of the current values of the three measures
and their lags. We then selected between variables and their lags for the second
stage PCA based on whichever has higher correlation with the first-phase index.
This results in a composite index of investor sentiment (ISENT) as follow:
ISENT t = 0.513 NIPOt−1 − 0.554 CEFDt − 0.655 V FTSEIX t−1,
The first component of the PCA results for ISENT explains 62% of the com-
mon variation. The correlation between the first-phase index and ISENT is 0.70.
Furthermore, to account for the possibility that the PCA captures the common
business cycle component instead of investor sentiment, we followed the same steps
as before to compute an orthognalised version of ISENT as follow:7
ISENT⊥t = 0.590 NIPOt − 0.448 CEFDt − 0.671 V FTSEIX t−1,
7 The index is orthognalised against Term-spread, yield on 10 year governmental bonds, growth
rate in GDP, inflation, unemployment rate and percentage change in the level of industrial
production.
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The first component of the PCA results for ISENT explains 55% of the com-
mon variation. The correlation between the ISENT t and ISENT
⊥
t is 0.67. Sim-
ilar to Baker & Wurgler (2006), we found no impact on the properties of ISENT
after orthognalising against macro factors.
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4.1. Introduction
Efforts to explain stock market returns reveal that one model does not fit
all. Early attempts by Lintner (1965); Sharpe (1964); Treynor (1961) gave rise
to the Capital Asset Pricing Model in which stock returns are priced using the
excess of market returns over the risk free rate or market risk premium. However,
empirical evidence shows that this one factor model lacks the ability to explain the
cross-sectional variation in stock returns (e.g. Banz (1981); Bhandari (1988); Chan
(1985); Gibbons (1982); Hyde & Sherif (2010); Reinganum (1981)). The univariate
model was enhanced by Fama & French (1993) who propose the addition of size
and value premiums to the CAPM estimation. The inclusion of the difference
between returns on small and big stocks and between high and low book-to-market
stocks increases the explanatory power of models of the cross-sectional variation
of returns. Nevertheless, subsequent research on the Fama & French (1993) three
factor model shows that only a small portion of the variation of stock returns
is explained (He et al., 1996). In addition, the three factor approach fails to
explain the existence of stock market anomalies such as the winner-loser effect of
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Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) which is subsequently captured by the momentum
factor developed by Carhart (1997).
The classical framework of asset pricing models has been further frustrated
by the failure to explain consistent deviation of stock prices from their funda-
mental values. One example is the closed-end funds discount puzzle. Closed-end
fund share prices should approximately equal the fund’s net asset value per share
(NAV). However, closed-end funds usually trade at prices below the NAV. Lee
et al. (1991) argue that closed-end fund discount is evidence of the impact of in-
vestor sentiment on stock returns. In addition, studies of investor irrationality
indicate a role for investor sentiment in explaining time-series and cross-sectional
variation of stock market returns. Examples of these studies are (Abraham et al.
(1993); Baker & Wurgler (2006); Kothari & Shanken (1997); Neal & Wheatley
(1998); Shiller (1981, 2000); Wang (2003)).
The impact of managerial sentiment on stock returns has already been estab-
lished in previous research. Salhin et al. (2016) show that managerial sentiment is
a reliable predictor of time series of stock returns. In addition, a number of studies
show that managers use pro forma earnings disclosures along with other corporate
actions to cater for investor sentiment, and hence returns (see, e.g., Baker et al.
(2003); Brown et al. (2012); Cooper et al. (2001)). Furthermore, Baker & Wurgler
(2013) provide detailed discussion on how managers react to investor sentiment
and asset mispricing through market timing. However, relatively little consider-
ation has been paid to the importance of managerial sentiment in explaining the
cross-sectional variation of stock market returns. The present study seeks to ad-
dress that gap in the literature by testing the performance of a set of asset pricing
models that incorporate managerial sentiment. Similar to investor sentiment, we
expect that managerial sentiment can explain the variation in cross-sectional stock
returns.
In this chapter, we test alternative models of asset pricing such as CAPM,
Fama & French (1993) three factor model (FF), Carhart (1997) four factor model
(4FF) to compare their results with managerial and investor sentiment-augmented
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asset pricing models. Similar to chapter 2, we construct our core managerial senti-
ment index (CMSI) using business surveys provided by the European Commission
(EC). For investor sentiment, we employ principal component analysis to extract
the common sentiment component of three measures of investor sentiment; closed-
end fund discount, the number of initial public offering and volatility index which
we call (ISENT).1 We examine the models against four test portfolios formed on
size, book-to-market, standard deviation, and intersecting portfolios ranked on size
and momentum factors.2 Our findings show that managerial sentiment is able to
explain 75% (3 out of four) of value-weighted test portfolios compared to CAPM
(25%), FF(25%), 4FF(25%) and 4FF plus ISENT (50%). In addition, Hansen and
Jagannathan model misspecification test suggests that models that incorporate
the CMSI yields smaller mispricing error relative to CAPM, FF and 4FF.
Moreover, Baker & Wurgler (2013) argue that estimating the impact of in-
vestor and managerial sentiment simultaneously would be expected to provide
more insight on the relationship with stock returns. Therefore, we test models
that include proxies for both investor and managerial sentiment in addition to the
four factors of Carhart (1997). Our results demonstrate that such models can ex-
plain 100% of equally and value-weighted test portfolios. Furthermore, we follow
Lemmon & Portniaguina (2006) and examine the impact of sentiment indices on
size, value and momentum premiums. Similar to their findings on investor senti-
ment, we show that lagged measures of managerial sentiment negatively forecast
short-term changes (1-3 month) in size premium. In addition, we find that the
value premium responds to relatively long-term changes (12 month) in investor
and managerial sentiment indices. However, and consistent with Lemmon & Port-
niaguina (2006), we fail to find evidence on the impact of investor or managerial
sentiment on momentum premium.
1 More details on the power of these measures to predict stock returns are provided by Baker &
Wurgler (2006, 2007); Lee et al. (1991); Whaley (2000), and Nikkinen & Va¨ha¨maa (2010)).
2 Size, book-to-market, and momentum factors and test portfolios are obtained from the Xfi
Centre for Finance and Investment at the University of Exeter which updates the sample of
Gregory et al. (2013). Available at http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/centres/xfi,
accessed on 18 February 2017.
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We structure the rest of this chapter is as follow: Section 2 presents the em-
pirical model and methodology employed to test alternative asset pricing models.
Section 3 discusses data and provide some summary statistics. In section 4, we
test different fundamental and behavioural asset pricing models. Section 5, we in-
vestigate the impact of sentiment indices on size, value and momentum premiums.
Section 6 concludes.
4.2. Empirical models, specification tests and vari-
able constructions
4.2.1 Empirical models
We base the first part of our analysis on six asset pricing models with different
specifications incorporating behavioural as well as fundamental factors.
4.2.1.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
Rpt− Rft = αp + βp,RMRF RMRF t + εpt, (4.1)
where Rpt is the return of portfolio p for month t, Rft is the risk-free rate
for month t, RMRF t is the standard CAPM market risk factor calculated as
Rmt− Rft, where Rmt is the return on market portfolio and εpt is the error term.
4.2.1.2 Fama-French (1993) three factor model (FF)
Rpt− Rft = αp + βp,RMRF RMRF t + βp,SMB SMBt + βp,HML HMLt + εpt,
(4.2)
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where SMBt denotes the size factor and HMLt is the value factor for time
t. SMB and HML are calculated from six portfolios (2 size and 3 book-to-market
(BTM) portfolios).
4.2.1.3 Carhart (1997) four factor model (4FF)
In addition to the three factors of Fama & French (1993), Carhart (1997)
added a momentum term to represent “winner minus loser” factor as follow:
Rpt− Rft = αp + βp,RMRF RMRF t + βp,SMB SMBt + βp,HML HMLt
+ βp,MOM MOM t + εpt,
(4.3)
where MOM t is the momentum factor at month t.
4.2.1.4 Four factor model plus managerial sentiment (4FF CMSI)
Rpt− Rft = αp + βp,RMRF RMRF t + βp,SMB SMBt + βp,HML HMLt
+ βp,MOM MOM t + βp,CMSI CMSI t + εpt,
(4.4)
where CMSI t is the core managerial sentiment index at month t.
4.2.1.5 Four factor model plus investor sentiment (4FF ISENT)
Rpt− Rft = αp + βp,RMRF RMRF t + βp,SMB SMBt + βp,HML HMLt
+ βp,MOM MOM t + βp,ISENT ISENT t + εpt,
(4.5)
where ISENT t is a composite index of investor sentiment at month t.
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4.2.1.6 Four factor model plus investor & managerial sentiment (4FF ISENT CMSI)
Rpt− Rft = αp + βp,RMRF RMRF t + βp,SMB SMBt + βp,HML HMLt
+ βp,MOM MOM t + βp,ISENT ISENT t + βp,CMSI CMSI t + εpt,
(4.6)
In addition to the previous models, we employed forecasting regressions with
different horizons to test if investor and managerial sentiment predict time-series
variation in value, size and momentum premium. Following Lemmon & Portni-
aguina (2006) and Swaminathan (1996), we regress size (SMB), value (HML) and
momentum (MOM) factors on lagged values of CMSI and ISENT as well as control
variables. Control variables include; lagged risk factors, 3-Month Treasury bill (T-
bill), T-spread calculated as the difference in yields between 10-Year and 3-Month
T-bill, percentage change in industrial production level (IPT) and GDP growth
rate. We estimate OLS models for one, three, six and twelve month horizons as
follow:
Factort = φ0 + φ1 Factort−i + φ2 CMSI t−i +
5∑
j=0
βjψjt−i + υt, (4.7)
Factort = φ0 + φ1 Factort−i + φ2 ISENT t−i +
5∑
j=0
βjψjt−i + υt, (4.8)
where Factort is either the size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum (MOM)
premiums at month t, Factort−i is the lagged values of risk premiums, CMSI t−i
is the core managerial sentiment index, ISENT t−i is a composite index of investor
sentiment, i denotes the forecasting horizon with values one, three, six and twelve
month, ψjt−i is a matrix includes control variables, φ0 is an intercept and υt is the
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disturbance term. We use Newey-West standard errors to assess the statistical
significant of regression coefficients.
4.2.2 Specification tests
To test the six asset pricing models in section 2.1., we rely on both parametric
and non-parametric tests.
4.2.2.1 Parametric tests
For parametric tests, we follow Fama & French (2016) by using Gibbons et al.
(1989) test statistic [hereafter GRS]. Since each asset pricing model yields a vector
of intercepts α̂p = [α̂p1, α̂p2, α̂p3, . . . . . . α̂pn] where n is the number of test portfolios,
the GRS test examines if all alphas are jointly indistinguishable from zero. The
test has been used widely in asset pricing literature (Michou et al. (2007); Chou
et al. (2012); Gregory et al. (2013); and Nichol & Dowling (2014)).3
4.2.2.2 Non-parametric test
Parametric tests provide evidence on whether a specific model, given a set of
assumptions about the distribution of the underlying data, provides an accurate
estimation of the observed data. To confirm robustness of our parametric tests,
we also compare models using the non-parametric Hansen & Jagannathan (1997)
distance (HJ distance, hereafter). Our choice of the method is consistent with
previous studies on empirical tests of asset asset pricing models (Chen & Sherif,
2016; Gospodinov et al., 2016; Kan & Robotti, 2009). The HJ distance measures
the distance between the family of stochastic discount factors (SDF) in which all
3 The GRS test is criticised for producing less robust results since it assumes the residuals from
the model to be uncorrelated, normally distributed and homoscedastic (Cochrane, 2000).
Therefore, we address such criticism by estimating our models using systematic GMM and test
the hypothesis that all alphas are jointly different from zero using Wald test. However, there is
no significant difference in the results. The GMM findings are available from authors upon
request.
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assets are correctly priced and the SDF associated with a candidate asset pricing
model. Hansen & Jagannathan (1997) define the distance as follow:
If an asset pricing model is correctly specified, there must be a pricing kernel
m ∈M that correctly price an asset as in Euler’s equation E(mR) = p, where R
is the asset payoffs and p is the asset price, and M is a family of all pricing kernels
that correctly price every asset. If an asset pricing model is false, its pricing kernel
proxy ω /∈ M . Therefore, there will be a positive distance between ω and m as
follow:
δ = min
m ∈L2
‖ω −m‖ , (4.9)
Equation 4.9 can be then rewritten as a Lagrangian minimization problem as
follow:
δ2 = min
m∈L2
sup
λ∈Rn
{E(ω −m)2 + 2λ´ [E(mR)− p]}, (4.10)
Since m can be practically estimated by m˜, it can be used along with λ˜ to
solve equation 4.10. Solving equation 4.10 results in:
ω − m˜ = ´˜λR, (4.11)
where ω− m˜ is the minimal adjustment to ω in order to make it a correct pricing
kernel and
λ˜ = E(RR´)−1 E(ωR− p), (4.12)
Hansen and Jagannathan show that the distance equals (δ):
δ = ‖ω − m˜‖ =
∥∥∥∥ ´˜λR∥∥∥∥ = [´˜λ E(RR´)λ˜] 1/2, (4.13)
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Substituting the value of λ˜ from equation 4.12 gives:
δ =
[
E(ωR− p)´ E(RR´)−1 E(ωR− p)
]1/2
, (4.14)
4.2.3 Variables constructions
Since investor and managerial sentiment are unobservable, we extract from
business surveys and stock market measurements. In this section, we describe
the procedures we follow to construct those proxies for investor and managerial
sentiment.
4.2.3.1 Investor Sentiment
We use principal component analysis to construct a composite measure of
investor sentiment (ISENT) using three indicators; the number of initial public
offerings (NIPOs), closed-end fund discounts (CEFD), and volatility index (VFT-
SEIX). We follow the same procedure described by Baker & Wurgler (2006) to
construct the index. In the first phase, we estimate the first principal component
of three distinct proxies for investor sentiment and their lag values which results in
an index with six loadings one for each of the current and lag values of the proxies
as follow:
Comp1,1 = Θ
T
1,1[X| L], Comp1,1 ∈ R (4.15)
where COMP 1,1 is the first component of investor sentiment measures from
the first-phase PCA, Θ is a vector of coefficients of the first component and “X| L”
augments
−→X and −→L that contain the current values of the three measures of
investor sentiment as x1, x2, and x3 and lagged values `1, `2, and `3, respectively
as follow:
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−→X =

x1
x2
x3
 ,−→L =

`1
`2
`3
 , (16)
we select
−→Z such that:
∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3} , −→Z i =

xi, ρ(xι, `ι) > ρ(xι, `ι)
xi
⊕
`i, ρ (xι, `ι) = ρ(xι, `ι)
`i, ρ(xι, `ι) < ρ(xι, `ι)
(4.16)
where ρ is the correlation coefficient and ρ : R2 → R and −→Z contain investor
sentiment measures for the second phase index.
More plainly, we calculate the correlation between the first-phase index and
each of the current and lagged values of the three proxies. We select between
variables and their lags to implement a second phase PCA based on whichever has
higher correlation coefficient with the first-phase index. The second-phase index
is then defined as:
COMP 1,2 = Θ
T
1,2
−→z , (4.17)
where COMP 1,2 is the first component of investor sentiment from the second-
phase PCA which is translated to an index of investor sentiment (ISENT t) as
follow:
ISENT t = 0.513 NIPOt−1 − 0.554 CEFDt − 0.655 V FTSEIX t−1, (4.18)
The PCA first component for ISENT explains 62% of the common variance.
The correlation coefficient between ISENT and the first-step index is 0.70.
89
Chapter 4: Managerial Sentiment, Asset Prices and Risk Premiums
4.2.3.2 Managerial Sentiment
Similar to chapter 3, we construct a core managerial sentiment index (CMSI)
from a linear combination of specific managerial survey questions which show
significant power in predicting sector returns as reported by Salhin et al. (2016).
The survey questions used in calculating CMSI are reported in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1
Survey questions for constructing the Core Managerial Sentiment Index
The table reports managerial survey questions that show significant power in pre-
dicting sector returns as reported by Salhin et al. (2016).
Sector Questions
Manufacturing • Expectations about the future level of production.
• Assessment of the current order-book levels.
Construction • Evolution of current overall order book.
• Employment expectation in the next 3 months of the
business activity.
Retail Trade • Order expectation in the next 3 months of the business
activity.
Services • Business situation development over the past three
month of the business activity.
• Evolution of demand over the past three month of the
business activity.
• Employment expectation in the next 3 months of the
business activity
CMSI for every sector is calculated as the simple arithmetic mean of the
survey questions as follow:
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CMSI i =
∑n
q=1Questq
ns
, (4.19)
where, CMSI i is the core managerial sentiment index for sector i, Questq is
the survey question q for sector i, n is the number of survey questions for sector i.
The market CMSI is the weighted average of the CMSI per each sector as
follow:
CMSI =
∑4
i=1Wi CMSI i, (4.20)
where CMSI is the core managerial sentiment index for the UK market, Wi
is the weight for sector i, CMSI i is the core managerial sentiment index for sector
i.
Sector weights are calculated following the procedures described by Salhin
et al. (2016) with 50% to Manufacturing, 37.5% to Services, and 6.25% for each
of the Retail Trade and Construction sectors. The CMSI is scaled to have a mean
of 100 and a standard deviation of 10.
4.3. Data
To examine our models, we use UK data on risk factors, investor and man-
agerial sentiment, test portfolios and macroeconomic variables. Data covers the
period from January 2000 to September 2014.
4.3.1 Data on risk factors
We obtain data on market (RMRF), size (SMB), value (HML), and Momen-
tum (MOM) risk premium for the period from January 2000 to September 2014.
91
Chapter 4: Managerial Sentiment, Asset Prices and Risk Premiums
Market risk premium is the difference between return on the market portfolio
(FTSE All Share Index) and the risk-free rate (three-month T-Bill). SMB and
HML are calculated using six portfolios formed from the intersection of two size
portfolios [Small (S) and Big (B)], and three value portfolios [High (H), Medium
(M), and Low (L)]. Size is measured by market capitalization and value is mea-
sured by the book-to-market ratio (BTM). The calculation of SMB and HML is
as follow:
SMB = SL + SM + SH
3
− BL + BM + BH
3
, (4.21)
HML = SH + BH
2
− SL + BL
2
, (4.22)
Momentum (MOM) factor is calculated from six portfolios formed using the
intersection of size [Small (S) and Big (B)] and past stock return performance
or momentum [Up (U), Medium (M) and Down (D)]. The MOM factor is then
calculated as follow:
MOM = SU + BU
2
− SD + BD
2
, (4.23)
Data on RMRF, SMB, HML, and MOM factors are obtained from the Xfi
Centre for Finance and Investment at the University of Exeter which updates the
sample in Gregory et al. (2013).
4.3.2 Data on investor sentiment
To construct a composite measure of investor sentiment, we use data on the
number of initial public offerings (NIPOs), closed-end fund discount (CEFD),
and FTSE 100 Volatility Index (VFTSEIX) as measures of investor sentiment.
The number of initial public offerings (NIPOs) is obtained from London Stock
Exchange for the period from January 2000 to September 2014. Total number
of IPOs equal 2054 companies for the entire sample period. For closed-end fund
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discount (CEFD), we follow Lee et al. (1991) to calculate a monthly value-weighted
index of discounts as follow:
CEFDt =
[∑nt
i=1
NAV it− Pit∑nt
i=1 NAV it
]
X 100, (4.24)
where NAV it is the net asset value of closed-end fund i at the end of month
t, Pit is the share price of closed-end fund i at the end of month t, and nt is the
number of closed-end funds with available price (P) and net asset value (NAV) at
the end of month t. Data on NAV and P are obtained from Datastream.
The Volatility Index (VFTSEIX) is the implied standard deviation of options
on the FTSE100 Index. VFTSEIX reflects how certain investors are about the
volatility of the stock market while higher (lower) VFTSEIX refers to pessimistic
(optimistic) investors. VFTSEIX is obtained from Datastream.
4.3.3 Data on managerial sentiment
To construct our core managerial sentiment index (CMSI), we use monthly
business surveys provided by the European Commission (EC). Survey data covers
the period from January 2000 till September 2014 for four UK sectors, namely;
Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade, and Services. Based on Salhin et al.
(2016) findings, we select survey questions that have strong predictive power of
stock returns in order to construct CMSI. Details on the construction of the CMSI
is provided in section 3.
4.3.4 Test portfolios
We use four sets of equally-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) test
portfolios formed on value, size, standard deviation and momentum. The first set
contains 10 portfolios formed on deciles of book to market ratio of all UK firms.
The second set is constructed from 10 portfolios formed on deciles of size of all UK
firms. The third set contain 25 (5 x 5) portfolios ranked on the standard deviation
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of prior 12-month returns. The fourth set includes 25 (5 x 5) intersecting size and
momentum portfolios formed by using the whole sample of firms. Size portfolios
are formed from four portfolios from the largest 350 UK firms and one from the
rest of the whole sample. Momentum portfolios are formed using the whole sample
of UK firms. Similar to risk factors, data on test portfolios are obtained from the
Xfi Centre for Finance and Investment.4
4.3.5 Macroeconomic variables
We use macroeconomic series as control variables to test the impact of senti-
ment indices on size, value and momentum premiums. We obtain monthly data on
three-month treasury bill (T-bill), unemployment (UNEMP), Term spread (cal-
culated as the yield on 10 years’ government bonds minus three-month T-bill
rate), percentage change in total index of production (IPT), and GDP growth
rate (GDP). Data is obtained from Datastream for the period from January 2000
to September 2014. GDP is only available in quarterly form; therefore, we employ
polynomial interpolation to convert GDP figures into monthly values. Descriptive
statistics on factors, sentiment measures, test portfolios and control variables are
provided in Tables [4.2-4.7].
4.4. Testing fundamental and behavioural asset
pricing models
Time series regressions for asset pricing models are reported in Tables 8-11.
In each table, we report estimates of the intercept term and their statistical signif-
icance for each asset pricing model and test portfolios. We only report estimates
of the intercept term since our main objective is to test for the rejection of the
null hypothesis that all α values are indistinguishable from zero using GRS test
4 More details are available at http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/centres/xfi, accessed
on 18 February 2017. Construction of factors and test portfolios is detailed in Gregory et al.
(2013).
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Table 4.2
Descriptive statistics for sentiment indicators, Fama-French and Carhart fac-
tors and macroeconomic indices.
Data covers the period from January 2000 to September 2014 for the UK market.
ISENT is a proxy for investor sentiment and calculated using principal component
analysis (PCA) of three measures of investor sentiment; the number of initial
public offerings, closed-end fund discounts and FTSE100 volatility index. CMSI
is a proxy for managerial sentiment. RMRF is the market risk premium, SMB
is the size risk premium, HML is the value risk premium and MOM reflects the
momentum effect. T-spread is the difference in the yields between 10-Year and
3-Month Treasury bill (T-bill). IPT and GDP are percentage change in industrial
production level and the GDP growth rate, respectively.
Panel A: Risk Factors
mean
(%)
sd
(%)
median
(%)
trimmed
(%)
min
(%)
max
(%)
RMRF 0.22 4.16 0.85 0.45 -13.61 9.90
SMB 0.23 3.45 0.15 0.31 -11.48 15.61
HML 0.50 3.55 0.38 0.32 -18.61 12.29
MOM 0.79 5.54 1.10 1.19 -25.03 16.04
Panel B: Sentiment
mean sd median trimmed min max
ISENT 0.00 1.37 0.04 0.04 -3.84 3.10
CMSI 95.45 12.03 98.00 96.86 55.10 111.8
Panel C: Macroeconomic Indices
mean sd median trimmed min max
T-bill 2.95 2.14 3.82 2.94 0.23 5.96
T-spread 1.09 1.31 0.93 1.03 -0.71 3.60
UNEMP 3.49 0.83 3.10 3.44 2.40 4.90
IPT -0.07 0.98 0.00 -0.03 -4.68 2.60
GDP 0.43 0.66 0.56 0.53 -2.2 1.42
statistic. In addition, we report the mean adjusted R2 of test portfolios for each
model. Estimates and test statistics are reported for both equally-weighted (Panel
A) and value-weighted portfolios (Panel B).
For value portfolios, traditional CAPM fails the GRS with 70% of EW and
30% of VW test portfolios have significant intercepts. Insignificant intercepts for
CAPM are more apparent in low value portfolios. Results for Fama-French three
factor model are not notably different from CAPM with the exception of the
GRS test for VW portfolios. FF intercepts are 60% significant for EW portfolios
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and only 20% significant intercepts for VW portfolios. However, the incremental
adjusted R2 is approximately 26% indicating the power of SMB and HML factors
to explain stock returns. For Carhart (1997) model (4FF), results are similar to
CAPM and reject the null hypothesis that all intercept terms are jointly equal
zero.
The addition of the core managerial sentiment index (CMSI) to 4FF model
improves results, with only 20% of EW and 0% of VW portfolios having signif-
icant intercepts. The significant intercepts are more concentrated in portfolios
with high book-to-market ratios. 4FF CMSI model fails the GRS for EW portfo-
lios, however, the model provides highly insignificant intercepts for value-weighted
portfolios. The addition of investor sentiment (ISENT) yields similar results to
FF and 4FF models and fails GRS tests. However, utilising an asset pricing
model that encompasses both investor and managerial sentiment strongly passes
the GRS test. Incremental adjusted−R2 is very small with increase of 0.08% in
EW portfolios and 0.18% in VW portfolios.
Table 4.9 reports regression results for 10 EW and VW portfolios sorted on
size. Simple CAPM yields significant alphas in 60% of equally-weighted and value-
weighted test portfolios. We observe that CAPM fails to explain returns of small
sized portfolios as indicated by the concentration of significant alphas in S1 to
S6 portfolios. The GRS test statistics for CAPM indicates a rejection of the null
hypothesis that alphas of EW portfolios jointly equal zero. For VW portfolios,
CAPM passes the GRS test with p-value of 0.1987. Results for Fama & French
(1993) three factor model and Carhart (1997) four factor model are different for
size test portfolios. The two models fail to pass the GRS test for size portfolios with
FF only passing the test for EW size portfolios. The distribution of insignificant
intercept terms is comparable across all size portfolios for FF and 4FF models.
Similar to value portfolios, adding managerial sentiment index (CMSI) im-
prove results for value-weighted size portfolios with GRS test statistic of 0.9 and
p-value of 0.5339. The intercept terms for equally-weighted portfolios are signifi-
cant in 50% of test portfolios and are concentrated in medium sized portfolios. The
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impact of adding ISENT is similar, but less powerful, to 4FF CMSI for equally-
and value-weighed size portfolios. The incremental increase in adjusted R2 after
adding CMSI (ISENT) is 0.18% (0.31%) for EW portfolios and 0.12% (0.05%) for
VW portfolios. In both EW and VW, a model with ISENT and CMSI significantly
passes the GRS test with incremental adjusted R2 (compared to simple FF model)
of 1.02% and 0.32% for EW and VW portfolios, respectively.5
Table 4.10 exhibits findings on the ability of asset pricing models to explain
25 portfolios returns sorted on the prior 12-month standard deviation of returns
with SD1 denotes the least risky portfolio and SD25 is the riskiest portfolio. Panel
A shows that all models fail the GRS test for equally-weighted volatility portfolios
except of FF ISNET CMSI model which passes the test. It also shows that asset
pricing models lack the ability to explain return portfolios with low risk charac-
teristics as evidenced by the distribution of the insignificant alphas of each model.
On the contrary, Carhart (1997) simple and sentiment-augmented models pass
the GRS test for VW volatility portfolios with higher p-values are associated with
managerial sentiment for the test and for all intercept terms.
Our final test portfolios are 25 (5 x 5) equally and value-weighted portfolios
formed on book-to-market ratio and momentum. Table 4.11 shows the results for
six asset pricing models that encompass both fundamental and behavioural fac-
tors. The first character of portfolio’s name denotes size and the second denotes
the momentum category. For example, SL denotes small size/low momentum, S2
denotes small size/second lowest momentum category and B, M and H denote big,
middle and high, respectively. As reported in Table 4.11, our models mostly fail
the GRS test for EW and VW size and momentum intersecting portfolios. The
results are not very surprising since the poor performance of asset pricing mod-
els in explaining the returns of portfolios ranked based on momentum is already
documented in previous research (Fletcher, 2010; Gregory et al., 2013). However,
CMSI-augmented four factor models tested on equally-weighted portfolios pass the
5 We also tested our models on 25 portfolios formed on the intersection between size and
book-to-market value. The results do not change compared to size and value test portfolios,
hence, not reported. However, we report their Hansen and Jagannathan results in Table 4.13.
Results on models estimates and GRS test are available from authors upon request.
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GRS test with significant intercept terms which are more concentrated in small
portfolios with low momentum characteristics. This indicates that models are
more able to explain returns of big companies whose stock returns exhibit high
momentum. In sum, all our tests show the powerful impact of adding managerial
sentiment to asset pricing models, specifically when testing value-weighted portfo-
lios. A summary of alphas and GRS results for test portfolios is reported in Table
4.12.
The results of Hansen and Jagannathan (HJ) test confirms previous results
as shown by Table 4.13. The table reports the HJ distance (δ) with the associated
standard errors for the six asset pricing models. The reported results show a sig-
nificant improve in ability of asset pricing models in explaining the cross-sectional
variation of stock returns after incorporating our managerial sentiment proxy. For
equally (value) weighted portfolios, models contain the CMSI yields a reduction
of 0.5991 (0.7255) in the pricing error distance relative to the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM). These findings suggest a significant improvement for managerial
sentiment-augmented asset pricing model. We report the mean and standard de-
viation of the stochastic discount factor of each model against the Hansen and
Jagannathan bound in Figure 4.1.6
4.5. Sentiment and size, value and momentum pre-
miums
Firm characteristics represent important factors in determining the relation-
ship between investor sentiment and stock returns. Lee et al. (1991) provide
evidence that stocks of small sized firms are more prone to sentiment relative
to big firms. Further, Baker & Wurgler (2006) show that investor sentiment is
more strongly associated with small firms, extreme growth stocks and unprof-
itable stocks. Our aim in this section is to test whether proxies for investor as
6 In Figure 4.1, we use 10 value-weighted book-to-market portfolios to construct the HJ bound
and the stochastic discount factor of each model. Similar figures for other equally and
value-weighted portfolios are available from the author upon request.
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Figure 4.1: Hansen-Jagannathan Bounds
well as managerial sentiment forecast time-series variation in the size, value and
momentum premiums. Following Lemmon & Portniaguina (2006), we estimate
models in equations 10 and 11 over one, three, six and twelve months forecasting
horizons using OLS and we assess the statistical significance of our estimates us-
ing Newey-West standard errors. As reported by Table 4.14, one and three month
lagged measures of managerial sentiment index can forecast the size premium. The
negative relationship between lagged values of CMSI and SMB is consistent with
De Long et al. (1990) and Lemmon & Portniaguina (2006) results, which indicate
that small stocks earn low returns following periods with higher sentiment. How-
ever, the ability of our measure of investor sentiment (ISENT) to forecast the size
premium is only restricted to three-month forecasting horizon.
As shown by Table 4.15, forecasting models for value premium present in-
teresting results for investor as well as managerial sentiment. Lagged measures
of CMSI and ISENT exhibit forecasting power of value premium but only over
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12-month period. The negative relationship between CMSI and ISENT and HML
is consistent with Lemmon & Portniaguina (2006) and Baker & Wurgler (2006) in
which subsequent returns on value stocks are lower following periods of high levels
of sentiment and higher following periods of low levels of sentiment. However, we
found no evidence that momentum risk premiums respond to changes in either
investor or managerial sentiment indices as shown by Table 4.16.
4.6. Conclusion
We examine the traditional CAPM, Fama & French (1993) three factor, and
Carhart (1997) four factor models and contrast their findings against sentiment-
augmented asset pricing models. Our tests focus on extending traditional asset
pricing models by including investor and managerial sentiment indices. We test
our models using four constructions of equally- and value-weighted return port-
folios formed on size, value, standard deviation and momentum premiums. Our
finding shows that managerial sentiment has strong power over investor sentiment
in explaining returns of test portfolios, specifically value-weighted portfolios. In
most of cases (75% of test portfolios), managerial sentiment-augmented models
fail to reject the null hypothesis that model intercept terms are jointly equal to
zero indicating their power in explaining stock market returns. These findings
suggest that managerial sentiment index is a reliable measure of market sentiment
and should be considered in behavioural-based asset pricing models.
In addition to testing alternative specifications of asset pricing models, we
examined the impact of investor and managerial sentiment on size, value and mo-
mentum premiums over different forecasting horizons. We found that managerial
sentiment strongly predicts size premiums over short (1 to 3 month) forecasting
horizons when compared to investor sentiment. Furthermore, we found that value
premiums react to changes in managerial and investor sentiment over a horizon
of 12 months. On contrary, we fail to find evidence on the relationship between
sentiment indices and momentum premium. Our results provide important new
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evidence on specification of asset pricing models and will be useful to academics
and practitioners in a variety of contexts from understanding pricing of assets to
costs of capital and event studies. Moreover, the findings have implications for
regulators and policy makers concerned with the pricing of financial assets and
regulating stock markets.
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5.1. Introduction
This chapter provides a summary of the empirical findings related to the
thesis. It presents the implications and limitations of the results and discusses
potential areas of future research.
5.2. Summary of the main findings
In this thesis, we provided evidence for the role of managerial sentiment in
the stock market. Studies on behavioural finance implicitly assume that economic
agents hold the same level of sentiment across different industries. In our study, we
relaxed such an assumption and provided evidence that the sentiment-returns rela-
tionship is sector dependent. In essence, we argued that using sentiment measures
at the sectoral level improves our understanding of the sentiment-returns relation-
ship. We show that the power with which sector-specific sentiment forecasts stock
returns primarily depends on the characteristics of the sector; for instance, expec-
tations about productions and order levels forecast returns in the manufacturing
and retail trade sectors. On the other hand, employment expectations exhibit an
important factor in predicting construction sector returns.
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In addition, the results provided interesting insights into the impact of fi-
nancial crises on the sentiment-return relationship. We found that sector returns
become more sensitive to sentiment after relevant crises. Sentiment associated with
the manufacturing sector significantly affected sector returns post rather than pre-
dot com mania. Similar results hold for the construction sector and the sub-prime
crisis. Overall, these results support our expectation that the strength and sig-
nificance of the relationship between sentiment and stock returns varies between
sectors.
Furthermore, we contributed to the literature by constructing a powerful pre-
dictor of stock returns, which we called the Core Managerial Sentiment Index
(CMSI). In addition to forecasting a time series of stock returns, the CMSI ex-
hibits a notable ability to explain the cross-sectional variation in stock returns
relative to indicators of investor sentiment. It significantly improves the perfor-
mance of traditional asset pricing models such as CAPM, Fama & French (1993)
three factor model and Carhart (1997) four factor model. Moreover, we show that
CMSI explains some price anomalies, such as size and value effects.
In this study, we argued that managerial sentiment drives change in investor
sentiment. The findings suggest that managerial sentiment positively forecasts
investor sentiment over shorter time periods. Moreover, co-integration tests in-
dicated that managerial and investor sentiments have a longer relationship. In
particular, we find that investor sentiment converges on the long-run equilibrium
relationship when managers possess positive rather than negative sentiments. Fur-
thermore, we provide evidence that managers’ overconfidence leads to negative
investor sentiment in subsequent periods.
5.3. Implications of the study
The findings of our study have implications for academic scholars, practition-
ers, fund managers, policy-makers and regulators. They provide academics who
are concerned with empirical asset pricing with new insights into how managerial
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sentiment impacts the performance of the long-term investigated models. Individ-
ual investors are subject to asymmetric information problems when valuing the
companies in which they invest. This reflects a risk factor that investors price
when valuing financial assets. The power of managerial sentiment in explaining
the cross-sectional variation of stock returns may reflect how investors perceive
managers’ signals to the market.
For practitioners, our findings suggest that managerial sentiment and its im-
pact on sector returns provide new opportunities to enhance trading as well as
asset allocation strategies. Our results indicates that managers are over-confident
with regards to the future outcomes of their businesses. Their over-confidence
impacts investor sentiment which, in turn, has an influence on stock prices. The
finding could translate into a trading strategy in which investors short sell assets
in periods with high managerial sentiment and buy them when managers disclose
the financial results of their firms. In addition, fund managers may consider sec-
tors that are more or less prone to sentiment in their investment strategies to meet
investors risk preferences.
Further, the evidence on sentiment transmission from managers to investors
can provide stock market practitioners with insights into when and why managers
dismantle information on their businesses. Such insights will partially assist in
resolving the issue of information asymmetry and will forecast the impact of man-
agerial actions on stock returns. Regulators might also consider how their policies
might be received by managers in different sectors with respect to capital and in-
vestment allocation. In addition, our results on sentiment-augmented asset pricing
models may be of interest to regulators who are concerned with the estimation of
businesses’ cost of capital when pricing public services.
5.4. Limitations of the study
The findings and implications of this thesis should be considered in the context
of the following limitations.
122
Chapter 5: Conclusion
For the first empirical chapter, we use a shorter data period (17 years) for
the services sector relative to other sectors of the UK market. Data on manufac-
turing, construction and retail trade sectors covers 30 years from January 1985 to
December 2014. This may affect the comparability of parameter estimates, which
was the main interest of the study.
For the second empirical chapter, limitation lies in the use of Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA) to constrict the Investor Sentiment Index (ISENT). The
method mainly captures the linear correlation between its input variables, which
may affect our results for two reasons; firstly, the common component of our mea-
sures of investor sentiment may reflect other macro-economic factors that have
not been tested in our study. Secondly, there might be a non-linear relationship
between our measures of investor sentiment; therefore, PCA might not be enough
to capture the variation of the measures under investigation.
Finally, for the third empirical chapter, the correlation coefficient between
ISENT and CMSI is high. The inclusion of both variables in a single model may
have an impact on the results.
5.5. Directions for future research
The insights of this study provide several areas to investigate in future re-
search. In this study, using disaggregated managerial sentiment provided a better
understanding of the relationship between managerial sentiment and stock returns.
Relaxing the assumption that investors hold the same level of sentiment toward
different sectors may provide more interesting insights, especially when disaggre-
gated data is available on some measures of investor sentiment, such as IPOs and
turnover.
Furthermore, results for the second empirical chapter could be extended by
investigating the transmission of sentiment from investors to managers. An initial
investigation of this direction of the relationship, although not reported, shows
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significant results. Examining this further would shed some light on how the sen-
timent of managers is connected to what investors believe about their businesses.
In addition, we suggest investigating how managerial and investor sentiments are
transmitted around financial crises. Insights from this investigation could enhance
the prediction of pricing bubbles and other financial crises. Moreover, we suggest
expanding the study to examine other European markets, in particular when data
on managerial sentiment is available by the European Commission (EC).
Finally, future research could focus on constructing a market sentiment index
that takes the sentiment of different types of economic agents into consideration.
In other words, a composite measure that includes the sentiments of consumers,
managers and investors may provide a powerful predictor of the future state of the
economy.
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